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PREEMPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
Thomas W. Merrill
INTRODUCTION
Public law scholarship is increasingly turning from questions about the
content of law to questions about which institution should determine the
content of the law-that is, to "deciding who decides."' Implicit in this turn
is the understanding that public law-including broadly not just constitu-
tional law, but also administrative law and statutory interpretation-consists
of norms that are contestable and changing. In a world of normative flux,
the question naturally occurs: Who should be responsible for "say[ing] what
the law is?"2 The answer traditionally given by American legal academ-
ics-the federal courts, and especially the Supreme Court-may or may not
be the best choice in any given context. Other possible agents of norm ar-
ticulation-the constitutional amendment process, Congress, the President,
administrative agencies, state governments, world organizations, markets-
also need to be considered and evaluated on a comparative basis.
The law of preemption is ripe for reconsideration in light of this kind
of comparative institutional analysis.3 At least two broad trends support this
Charles Keller Beekman Professor, Columbia Law School. Thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Akhil
Amar, Steven Calabresi, Brad Clark, Bill Eskridge, John Langbein, John McGinnis, Gillian Metzger,
Marty Redish, Judith Resnick, Catherine Sharkey, and Peter Strauss for helpful input on earlier drafts. I
am also grateful to the members of the Northwestern Constitutional Theory seminar and to participants
in faculty workshops at Florida, Georgetown, and Yale Law Schools for their insights. David Bornstein,
J.D. Candidate, Columbia Law School, Class of 2009, provided outstanding research assistance.
I NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1994). A notable recent example is ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006). Comparative institu-
tional analysis in law is not new. A prominent work from an earlier generation is HENRY M. HART &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
2 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (3 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
3 For a preliminary consideration of the value of an institutional choice perspective in resolving
questions of federalism, with brief comments about preemption, see Ernest A. Young, Making Federal-
ism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1733, 1816-53 (2005) [hereinafter Young, Compensating Adjustments]; see also Ernest A. Young,
The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 8-13, 65-121 (2004) [hereinafter Young,
Two Federalisms]. I have also previously suggested, without extensive analysis, that the institutional
choice perspective could illuminate disputes having a federalism dimension. See Thomas W. Merrill,
Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 959, 981-82 (1997).
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inference. First, a number of Supreme Court decisions have suggested, at
least implicitly, that preemption questions should be redirected from the
courts to Congress. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,' for example, Jus-
tice Stevens's opinion for the Court stated that when Congress has enacted
an express preemption clause, this should provide the exclusive basis for
decision, rather than any doctrine of implied preemption.' This proposition,
if consistently applied, would promote the view that preemption should be
primarily a matter of legislative determination. Other decisions have ap-
plied a presumption against preemption unless a "clear and manifest pur-
pose of Congress" to preempt can be discerned.6 This presumption, if
consistently applied, would also shift authority for making preemption deci-
sions from the courts to Congress.
A second trend suggesting the need for an institutional choice analysis
is a growing controversy about whether courts should defer to the views of
administrative agencies on the preemptive effect of statutes and regula-
tions.7 The Supreme Court dodged the issue in Watters v. Wachovia Bank,
N.A.,' which presented the question whether a preemptive regulation issued
by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) was entitled to
Chevron deference by reviewing courts.' Five Justices, speaking through
Justice Ginsburg, concluded that it was unnecessary to reach this question
because the statute itself compelled preemption.'0 Three dissenting Jus-
tices-Justice Stevens joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia-
would have decided the question and held that agencies are not entitled to
Chevron deference for preemption determinations." Controversy has also
been stirred by the practice of federal agencies offering advisory opinions
about the preemptive effect of federal statutes and regulations. 2 Products
liability defendants have urged courts to defer to these views. The Supreme
Court again recently avoideded determining how much weight courts
should give such views as advanced by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), but has granted review in yet another case which now may require
4 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
5 Id. at 517.
6 The presumption was initially articulated in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947), and has been irregularly applied ever since. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
7 See generally Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice with Your Chevron?: Presumption and Deference in
Regulatory Preemption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823 (1995); Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Pre-
emption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737 (2004); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal
Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAuL L. REV. 227 (2007).
8 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007). I filed a brief amicus curiae in Watters on behalf of the Center for State
Enforcement of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Laws, Inc., arguing against application of Chevron
deference when reviewing agency declarations of preemption.
9 Id. at 1566; see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
10 Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1572 n.13.
n Id. at 1582-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12 See Sharkey, supra note 7.
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that it revisit the issue in the FDA context. 3 Obviously, a general practice
of deferring to administrative agencies on questions of preemption would
shift authority for resolving preemption controversies away from courts to-
ward agencies.
We can perceive in these two developments a broader set of questions
about preemption and institutional choice. Although preemption controver-
sies have traditionally been decided by courts in accordance with judge-
made preemption doctrine, at least two other institutional actors--Congress
and federal administrative agencies-might also be enlisted to make or par-
ticipate in these decisions. To be sure, no one is suggesting the wholesale
displacement of courts in resolving preemption controversies. The ques-
tions that have come to the fore involve "institutional competence writ
small,"' 4 in the sense that they ask how much weight courts should give to
the views of other institutions in resolving preemption controversies. This
Article offers some reflections on how this more constrained, second-order
inquiry into comparative institutional choice should be resolved in the con-
text of preemption.
I begin in Part I by reconsidering the nature of preemption. Here, I en-
dorse Stephen Gardbaum's view that preemption entails far more than the
idea that federal law prevails over state law in cases of conflict. 5 Instead,
preemption typically involves a decision to displace state law in some area
in order to advance perceived federal policy goals. Part II argues that the
current doctrinal framework for resolving preemption controversies signifi-
cantly misdescribes what occurs in preemption cases. The current frame-
work attempts to assimilate preemption to ordinary statutory interpretation;
however, the key question in most preemption cases entails a discretionary
judgment about the permissible degree of tension between federal and state
law, a question that typically cannot be answered using the tools of statu-
tory interpretation. Part III outlines, in a preliminary fashion, some consid-
13 The issue was avoided in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008), a case involving FDA-
approved medical devices. Review has been granted in Levine v. Wyeth, No. 2004-384, 2006 WL
3041078 (Vt. Oct. 27, 2006), cert granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008), which involves the adequacy of
warnings in drug package inserts. For lower court decisions responding to requests for deference to
FDA views about preemption, see Prohias v. Pfizer, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1234-35 (S.D. Fla.
2007); Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289, 313-17 (E.D. Pa. 2007); In re Bextra &
Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., No. M: 05-1699 CRB, 2006 WL 2374742, at *6-7
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006); Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525-35 (E.D. Pa. 2006); and
Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CGC-04-437382, 2006 WL 3939262, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 25, 2006).
See also In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 776, 786 (E.D. La. 2007) ("[T]he majority of
courts continue to find that state-law claims against prescription drug manufacturers are not preempted,
affording little to no deference to the FDA's recent statements.").
14 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885,
938 (2003).
15 Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994) [hereinafter
Gardbaum, Nature]; see also Stephen Gardbaum, Congress's Power to Preempt the States, 33 PEPP. L.
REV. 39 (2005); Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEx. L. REV. 795 (1996).
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erations that are relevant in considering preemption from an institutional
choice perspective, including constitutional, interpretational, and pragmatic
variables. Although no institution is ideally suited to make preemption de-
cisions, I conclude that courts are the least-worse choice, although it would
be desirable to supplement the judicial process with input from agencies on
selected variables.
Part IV offers three normative propositions about the role of agencies
in preemption designed to advance the conclusions of Part III: (1) the only
type of agency action that can serve as a source of a preemption determina-
tion by a court is one that has the force of law; (2) agencies can make pre-
emption determinations on their own authority only if this power has been
expressly delegated to them by Congress; and (3) courts should develop a
preemption-specific doctrine for considering agency views about preemp-
tion that focuses on the pragmatic dimensions of preemption controversies
and seeks to encourage agencies to permit public participation in proceed-
ings that implicate preemption.
I. THE NATURE OF PREEMPTION-RECONSIDERED
Preemption is one of the most widely applied doctrines in public law,
yet it remains surprisingly underanalyzed. Before we can embark on a con-
sideration of the proper division of institutional roles in resolving preemp-
tion controversies, we need to specify more clearly what it means for
federal law to "preempt" state law and from whence the authority for mak-
ing these determinations comes.
In a provocative article entitled The Nature of Preemption, Stephen
Gardbaum sought to clarify the analytics of preemption. 6 He advanced
three claims. First, preemption is different from and much more intrusive
upon state autonomy than supremacy. Second, preemption cannot be de-
rived from the Supremacy Clause, but must be grounded in the Necessary
and Proper Clause. Third, because preemption is grounded in a power
granted exclusively to Congress, preemption controversies should be re-
solved solely in terms of an inquiry into legislative intent. I believe Gard-
baum was right in the first claim but mistaken about the second and third.
Gardbaum's first claim distinguished between two ideas, which he
called preemption and supremacy. His analysis here, I believe, provides the
proper starting point for consideration of preemption from an institutional
choice perspective. In order to avoid begging any questions about constitu-
tional foundations, I use different names for the two ideas: "displacement"
and "trumping." But the distinction is essentially the same as that posited
by Gardbaum between preemption and supremacy.
Displacement occurs when state law in a particular area is nullified or
wiped out, leaving federal law as the sole source of legal obligation. Dis-
16 Gardbaum, Nature, supra note 15.
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placement is an offensive doctrine in the sense that federal law attacks and
eliminates state law. Displacement is like an eraser that rubs out state law
in a given area, leaving only federal law standing. The opposite of dis-
placement would be the understanding that federal law in a particular area is
nullified or wiped out, leaving state law as the sole source of legal obliga-
tion. Trumping occurs when the wiping out or displacement of federal law
by state law is prohibited. Trumping is therefore a defensive doctrine,
shielding federal law from attack by state law. The most commonly recog-
nized example of trumping would be where federal law and state law are
mutually exclusive, as when federal law requires A and state law requires
not-A. If state law were to be applied, this would rub out federal law. But
trumping would also come into play in any circumstance in which state law
is alleged to nullify federal law.17
Consider an example. Suppose a state has a law that makes the maxi-
mum permissible speed on primary highways sixty-five miles per hour.
Then, in order to promote fuel conservation, Congress enacts a law that
makes the maximum permissible speed on primary highways fifty-five
miles per hour. Hot Rod is clocked by a state trooper doing seventy-four
miles per hour on a primary highway. At his trial in state court for violating
the state speed limit, Hot Rod argues that the enactment of the federal speed
limit has preempted any state authority to punish him under state law for
excessive speeding, and thus he cannot be punished. This is an argument
for displacement. It posits that the federal government's entry into the field
of speed limits has rubbed out any state authority over this subject. Alter-
natively, suppose that Lead Foot is clocked doing sixty-four miles per hour
on a primary highway. At his trial, Lead Foot maintains that the only appli-
cable legal standard is the state speed limit, under which his conduct was
lawful. If the court rejects this claim, it is engaged in trumping. In reject-
ing the claim, the court establishes that both the federal and the state speed
limits are applicable to Lead Foot's conduct, such that they impose cumula-
tive requirements. If he has violated either one of these standards-in this
case the lower federal standard-he can be punished.
The relevance of the distinction between displacement and trumping to
our present inquiry is as follows. Preemption controversies, as they are
framed today, nearly always involve displacement. What is being fought
over in the name of preemption is whether federal law displaces state law,
leaving federal law the exclusive source of legal rights and obligations in
the area in question. Trumping is almost never an issue."t Hence, when we
17 In Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990), for example, a state court ruled that state statutory im-
munity barred consideration of a federal civil rights claim. The Supreme Court held that this nullifica-
tion of federal law by state law violated the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 376-78.
18 See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 228 (2000) (noting that the class of cases in
which compliance with both federal and state law is impossible is "vanishingly narrow"). It is unclear
whether this rarity is because cases of conflict in the strong sense of mutual exclusivity are rare or be-
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ask which institution should make decisions about preemption, we are ask-
ing which institution should make judgments about the propriety of dis-
placement.
It is worth pausing to consider the implications of this. Displacement
is strong medicine. It radically simplifies the regulatory structure in any
given area, replacing a melange of federal, state, and local requirements
with a single set of federal rules. This is why business corporations and
free market advocates tend to be pro-preemption.19 Displacement has sig-
nificant deregulatory consequences: it is almost always easier and less
costly to comply with one standard than to attempt to comply with multiple
standards that vary depending on the jurisdiction. Displacement also has
dramatic consequences for the scope of state authority. From the perspec-
tive of the state and local governments, displacement is little different than
a judgment holding state law unconstitutional. Once state law is declared to
be displaced, state actors no longer have any authority to regulate in the
area declared to be displaced. Their only recourse is to petition Congress
for legislation overturning the displacement ruling. This, to be sure, is an
easier barrier to overcome than a judgment holding state laws unconstitu-
tional, which would require a constitutional amendment. However, given
the difficulties of building a coalition among all affected states, squeezing
onto Congress's limited agenda for action, and surmounting the bicameral
and presentment requirements for legislation, displacement decisions are
rarely overturned and usually have permanent consequences for the scope
of state authority.20 This explains why state and local governments are in-
creasingly agitated about preemption rulings.1
cause when such conflicts arise, everyone recognizes that federal law prevails, so such conflicts virtually
never result in litigation.
19 See Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Em-
pirical Assessment, 14 SuP. CT. ECON. REv. 43, 53 (2006) (finding that preemption cases are "over-
whelming[ly]" initiated by business or private parties); Roderick H. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How
Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 29-30 (2007) (noting
that industry interest groups will often favor regulatory uniformity even when that uniformity results in
more stringent controls); David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Fed-
eral Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1158 (1999) (suggest-
ing that "Coasean" commentators favor broad preemption to encourage "a national market in
externalities").
20 See Note, New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical Study of Con-
gressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARv. L. REv. 1604, 1613-14
(2007) (finding that Congress overrode only two out of 127 preemption decisions rendered by the Su-
preme Court over a recent twenty-year period).
21 For example, the National Conference of State Legislatures maintains a "preemption monitor" on
its website. National Conference of State Legislatures, Preemption Monitor, http://www.ncsl.org/
standcomm/sclaw/PreemptionMonitorIndex.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2007). In a recent empirical sur-
vey of Supreme Court cases, Greve and Klick found "extensive and still-growing state amicus participa-
tion in preemption cases-predictably, almost exclusively on the anti-preemption side." Greve & Klick,
supra note 19, at 69.
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Given these features, we can also see that preemption in the sense of
displacement closely resembles, and effectively works in tandem with, the
dormant commerce clause doctrine. Both doctrines work to preserve the
United States as a single integrated commercial market in the face of state
legislation that threatens to create multiple markets of suboptimal scale.22
Like the dormant commerce clause, displacement nullifies or wipes out
state law in a given area, subject to potential override by Congress. And (as
we shall see) displacement, like the dormant commerce clause, requires a
discretionary judgment about the benefits and costs of legal uniformity that
is largely unguided by the text of any authoritative enactment. The princi-
pal differences between the doctrines are that the dormant commerce clause
rests on a imputation of intent to the Constitution and focuses on whether
state laws discriminate against or unduly burden interstate commerce;23 pre-
emption in the sense of displacement rests on an imputation of intent to
Congress and focuses on whether federal law requires exclusivity in order
to be fully effective.
Gardbaum's second claim was that the Supremacy Clause24 authorizes
only what I call trumping and does not provide any authority for what I call
displacement. Instead, he claimed, displacement should come about only if
Congress has exercised its power to displace under the Necessary and
Proper Clause.25 Here, I disagree. Certainly as a descriptive matter about
contemporary doctrine, the proposition is not true. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly identified the Supremacy Clause as the source of its authority to
declare state law displaced (preempted).26 As far as I have been able to de-
termine, the Court has never mentioned the Necessary and Proper Clause in
this context. Gardbaum's claim to the contrary appears to be a conceptual
one. His argument is that when we speak of one body of law as being "su-
preme" to another body of law, what this means, definitionally, is that the
22 For insightful commentary that recognizes this common theme in "federalizing" decisions, see
Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REv. 1353 (2006).
23 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (invalidating discriminatory
state legislation); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (invalidating state law disproportion-
ately burdening interstate commerce).
24 The Supremacy Clause provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not-
withstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
25 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
26 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540-41 (2001) (identifying the Suprem-
acy Clause as the "relatively clear and simple mandate" that allows Congress to "pre-empt[] state action
in a particular area"); Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 489 U.S. 493, 509 (1989) (refer-
ring to Congress's "power under the Supremacy Clause ... to preempt state law"); Fid. Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982) (declaring that the "pre-emption doctrine ... has
its roots in the Supremacy Clause"); Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 553 (1947) (proclaiming that when
state law "collides with the federal Constitution or an Act of Congress ... the action of a State under its
police power must give way by virtue of the Supremacy Clause").
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superior law prevails over the inferior in the event of a conflict between the
two in the strong sense of mutual exclusivity (A or not-A). In my terms,
Gardbaum maintains that the concept of supremacy entails only trumping:
blocking the subordinate law from nullifying the superior law.
I fail to see how it is analytically true that the concept of supremacy
entails only trumping. Certainly, the Supremacy Clause could be read in
this minimalist sense. But it could also be read more expansively, as mean-
ing that federal law displaces state law whenever state law would frustrate
the purposes or policies underlying federal law. To say that federal law is
"the supreme law of the land" in this broader sense would mean that the
purposes and policies reflected in federal law are entitled to full vindication,
even if this requires the displacement of state law. Constitutional history is
filled with examples in which clauses that could be interpreted either nar-
rowly or broadly have been favored with a broader interpretation over
time." The point is not that the broad meaning is always, or even usually,
the correct one. It is simply that one cannot declare one of two or more
meanings necessarily correct as a conceptual matter.
When we turn to the conventional sources of constitutional interpreta-
tion-text, drafting history, and precedent-we find that each in fact sup-
ports the proposition that the Supremacy Clause authorizes something
broader than trumping. As for the text, Caleb Nelson has pointed out that
the last phrase of the Supremacy Clause, which makes federal law supreme
"any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not-
withstanding," tracks the phrasing of clauses generally known as non ob-
stante clauses.2" These clauses, which were common at the time of the
Founding, were designed to disavow the canon against repeals by implica-
tion. In the context of conflicts between federal and state law, Nelson per-
suasively argues, this means that the Framers did not want federal statutes
to be interpreted narrowly in order to "save" state law from invalidation. In
other words, courts were not to strain the meaning of federal law "in order
to harmonize it with state law."29 This in turn suggests that the Supremacy
Clause was understood to have a broader significance than mere trumping.
The drafting history of the Supremacy Clause also supports a broad
reading. As Jack Rakove and others have recounted, the Constitutional
Convention had before it three potential mechanisms for assuring that fed-
27 Thus, for example, "commerce" might mean buying and selling goods, it might mean all eco-
nomic activity, or it might even mean any form of "intercourse," see AKIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107-08 (2005); "freedom of speech" might refer to verbal utterances
about politics, or it might refer to any human action having some communicative function, including
commercial advertising and nude dancing. See Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66
(1981) (stating that nude dancing is "not without... First Amendment protections"); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761-70 (1976) (holding commercial adver-
tising entitled to intermediate degree of protection as "speech").
28 Nelson, supra note 18, at 254-57.
29 Id. at 255.
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eral law would prevail in the face of opposition grounded in state law: (1)
the use of coercive force against defiant states, (2) Madison's proposal that
Congress be given an unrestricted power to "negative" any state law by fed-
eral legislation, or (3) the use of the courts to control individuals "who vio-
lated or interfered with national law. '30 The Convention rejected the first
two mechanisms in favor of the Supremacy Clause, which was seen as in-
corporating the third option.3 Since the Supremacy Clause was the only
specific mechanism agreed upon by the Framers for resolving federal-state
conflicts, this suggests that they envisioned the Clause as applying over a
broader range of controversies than those involving outright nullification of
federal law, that is, trumping.
I am not suggesting that the Framers envisioned the Supremacy Clause
as conferring a power as broad as Madison's proposed "negative," which
would have given a federal institution (Congress) unfettered discretion to
displace any state law it did not like. The Supremacy Clause makes federal
policy dominant only insofar as there is some perceived incompatibility be-
tween state law and "[t]his Constitution," "the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof," or federal treaties made before
or after the ratification of the Constitution. 32  But since the Supremacy
Clause was expressly adopted as a substitute for Madison's sweeping
"negative," it is doubtful that the Clause was regarded as being limited to
cases of mutual exclusivity or trumping. The Framers must have also con-
templated some degree of displacement power.
As for precedent, we need look no further than Chief Justice John Mar-
shall's foundational decisions construing the Supremacy Clause. In
McCulloch v. Maryland,33 Marshall stated that under the Clause "States
have no power ... to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the
operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress."34 And in Gib-
bons v. Ogden,35 he construed the Clause to require displacement of any
state law "interfering with" or "contrary to" federal law.36 These statements
impute significance to the Supremacy Clause far beyond being a mere rule
of decision to apply in cases of mutual exclusivity. They were of course
motivated by Marshall's ardent nationalism, which probably went beyond
30 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 171-72 (1996); see also Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of
Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REv. 1321, 1348-72 (2001); S. Candice Hoke, Transcending Conventional Su-
premacy: A Reconstruction of the Supremacy Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV. 829, 856-75 (1992); James S.
Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking
Required ofArticle III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 696, 709-13 (1998).
31 Hoke, supra note 30, at 865-70.
32 See Clark, supra note 30, at 1355 (citing U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2).
33 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
34 Id. at 436.
35 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
36 Id. at 210.
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the preferences of the median ratifier of the Constitution. It would be im-
possible, however, to maintain that these precedents have not permanently
conditioned our perceptions of the meaning and significance of the Su-
premacy Clause or that they are not cornerstones of American constitutional
law as it is practiced and functions today.
Gardbaum's third claim flowed directly from his second. If the Su-
premacy Clause supports only trumping, then the power to displace must be
found elsewhere in the Constitution. Gardbaum argued that the proper lo-
cus of displacement is the Necessary and Proper Clause.37 I think he was
undoubtedly correct that the Necessary and Proper Clause is a potential
source of authority for displacement. Thus, for example, Congress, pursu-
ant to its power to regulate interstate commerce, could decide to prescribe a
federal speed limit on all highways used in interstate commerce and could
further decide that in order to "carry into execution" this exercise of power
it is necessary and proper to displace all state laws prescribing a speed limit.
Where I disagree with Gardbaum is his claim that the Necessary and Proper
Clause is the exclusive source of authority for displacement. Constitutional
text, drafting history, and precedent all suggest that the Supremacy Clause
also provides this authority.
The source of authority for displacement has important implications for
questions of preemption and institutional choice. If the Necessary and
Proper Clause is the sole source of authority to displace, then Congress-
and only Congress-may make the determination whether to displace state
law in any given context. No one has claimed, to my knowledge, that Con-
gress may delegate the power conferred by the Necessary and Proper
Clause to either courts or agencies.38 Thus, if this is the sole source of au-
thority for displacement, Congress itself must make all decisions to dis-
place. Courts would be limited to construing duly enacted statutes of
Congress evincing an intention to displace, most commonly as reflected in
an express preemption clause. And Congress would not have the authority
to delegate to administrative agencies the power to displace.
If the power to displace is also or alternatively grounded in the Su-
premacy Clause, however, then the institutional choice possibilities are
much more open-ended. The Supremacy Clause, unlike the Necessary and
Proper Clause, is not directed solely to Congress. It is found in Article VI
37 The Necessary and Proper Clause provides: "The Congress shall have Power ... To make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers [of Article
I, § 8], and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
38 Indeed, the Necessary and Proper Clause is plausibly read as the source of constitutional authority
for Congress to make delegations of other powers. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I Section
1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2129-31 (2004). Cf Larry
Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Delegation Really Running Riot, 93 VA. L. REV. 1035 (2007) (imagin-
ing a host of powers that might be delegated under the Necessary and Proper Clause but not suggesting
that the Clause itself could be delegated).
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of the Constitution, which is directed at all governmental actors at both the
federal and state levels. Indeed, the Oath Clause of the Constitution, which
appears immediately after the Supremacy Clause, and is closely related to
it, expressly requires that all governmental actors take an oath "to support
this Constitution."39 This Clause specifically names legislative, executive,
and judicial officers of both the federal government and the states.
It is true that the Supremacy Clause makes specific mention of courts
and that the history of the Clause, as recounted by Rakove and others, sug-
gests that the Framers viewed the Supremacy Clause as adopting the judi-
cial option (as opposed to the coercion or legislative negative options) for
resolving conflicts between the federal government and the states.40 But the
only courts that are specifically alluded to in the Clause are state courts
("the Judges in every State"), not federal courts. It would be extremely
unlikely for the framers to have assumed that conflicts between federal and
state law were to be resolved exclusively by state courts. The most plausi-
ble explanation for the reference is that state judges were thought to be most
at risk of construing federal law narrowly in order to save state law from
displacement.' Since they were most at risk, the Founders singled them out
for special admonition. It does not follow, however, that the Framers as-
sumed that other governmental actors would not enforce the principle re-
flected in the Supremacy Clause.42
If we construe the Supremacy Clause as the source of authority for dis-
placement, and if that Clause is properly read as applying to all governmen-
tal actors, then the institutional choice question becomes urgent. The text
of the Constitution, on this reading, says that all governmental actors-
federal and state, executive, legislative, and judicial-have potential consti-
tutional authority to decide whether the vindication of federal law requires
displacement of state law. Without some supplementary set of principles to
narrow the choice among the various governmental institutions that could
wield this power, we could have endless cycling. A federal court could de-
cide that displacement is required, and a state legislature or state governor
could decide that it is not, and each could cite its oath to support the Consti-
tution and the Supremacy Clause as the source of authority for their respec-
tive judgments. This would invite chaos.
39 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cf. 3 ("The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Mem-
bers of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States
and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution.").
40 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
41 See RAKOVE, supra note 30, at 173-77; Nelson, supra note 18, at 249; Saikrishna Bangalore
Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REv. 1957, 2011-12 (1993); Martin H. Redish & Steven G.
Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federal-
ism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 85-86 (1998).
42 The Supreme Court has in fact held that state officials other than state judges are bound by the
Supremacy Clause. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 56-57 (1990); Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958).
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What is needed, in other words, is a constitutional doctrine that sup-
plements the text and original understanding of the Constitution and that al-
locates authority among governmental institutions to determine when
federal law requires displacement of state law-constitutional common law,
if you will.43 The Supreme Court has in fact developed such a doctrine,
some familiarity with which is required to consider the institutional choice
questions implicit in any decision to displace.
II. DISPLACEMENT AND PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
At this point, it makes sense to review briefly the preemption doctrine
that has been developed by the Supreme Court in the course of deciding
hundreds of preemption cases over a span of nearly two hundred years.
Like much constitutional common law, preemption doctrine is highly for-
mulaic, although no one seems to believe that the formal categories provide
significant guidance to courts and litigants in resolving particular cases."
The doctrine is also dominated by maxims about the importance of congres-
sional intent and the presumption against preemption, neither of which
seems to play a consistent role in determining how particular controversies
are resolved.
The formulaic aspect of preemption law consists of a judge-made cate-
gorization of different "types" or varieties of preemption. Here the cases
nearly always begin with a root distinction between "express" and "im-
plied" preemption.45 Express preemption applies when Congress has ad-
dressed the question of displacement of state law in the text of a statute,
either by including a preemption clause (a clause that specifies some degree
of displacement), a savings clause (a clause that disclaims some or all dis-
placement), or both. As previously noted, Justice Stevens attempted in
Cipollone to establish that an express preemption clause, where it applies,
should be the exclusive basis for deciding whether to displace state law.46
But his effort to constrain judicial discretion in this fashion collapsed in
43 See generally Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1975).
44 See Nelson, supra note 18, at 232 (noting a general consensus that "[m]odem preemption juris-
prudence is a muddle"); Spence & Murray, supra note 19, at 1146 (noting that preemption cases have
proven to be "vexing to the courts" and have produced a "conflicted and fractured body of case law").
45 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) ("State action may be fore-
closed by express language in a congressional enactment, by implication from the depth and breadth of a
congressional scheme that occupies the legislative field, or by implication because of a conflict with a
congressional enactment." (citations omitted)); Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 152-53 (1982) ("Pre-emption may be either express or implied, and 'is compelled whether Con-
gress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and
purpose."' (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977))).
46 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992). See supra notes 4-5 and accompany-
ing text.
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subsequent cases,47 and the campaign to adopt this limitation appears to
have been dropped.
The other branch of preemption doctrine consists of implied preemp-
tion doctrines. The Court has insisted that "the existence of conflict cogni-
zable under the Supremacy Clause does not depend on express
congressional recognition that federal and state law may conflict."48 Ac-
cordingly, the Court has held state law displaced without regard to whether
an express preemption clause exists49 and has held state law displaced even
when the statute contains an express saving clause."
We thus have multiple categories of implied preemption, the exact
number depending on who is doing the counting. 1 One category that ap-
pears on everyone's list is called field preemption. This applies when "fed-
eral law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field 'as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it."' 52
The idea here is that if federal law is sufficiently comprehensive so as to
constitute a complete code of regulation, then the court will attribute an in-
tention to Congress to displace state law.
Two other categories of implied preemption are conflict preemption
and frustration of purpose or obstacle preemption. Some writers collapse
these two categories into one, which they tend to call conflict preemption-
the point being that the difference between conflict and frustration of pur-
pose relates only to how sharp the tension is between federal and state law. 3
Given the above discussion regarding the distinction between displacement
and trumping,54 however, there is some virtue in maintaining conflict pre-
emption and frustration of purpose preemption as distinct categories of im-
plied preemption. Conflict preemption can be regarded as equivalent to
what I call trumping: application of state law would nullify federal law and
hence state law must give way. In contrast, frustration of purpose or obsta-
cle preemption (frustration preemption for short), clearly results in dis-
placement. State law is wiped out in order to provide for more effectual
47 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 868, 884-86 (2000) (finding implied preemp-
tion in the face of an express preemption clause that the majority construed as not calling for preemp-
tion); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287-89 (1995) (dismissing as "without merit" the
notion that "implied pre-emption cannot exist when Congress has chosen to include an express pre-
emption clause in a statute" and concluding that "[a]t best, Cipollone supports an inference that an ex-
press pre-emption clause forecloses implied pre-emption; it does not establish a rule").
48 Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000).
49 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348, 352 (2001).
50 Geier, 529 U.S. 861.
51 See Hoke, supra note 30, at 851 n.103 (noting Supreme Court cases listing between three and six
different categories of preemption).
52 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)).
53 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 18, at 265-90 (urging the abandonment of frustration of purpose or
obstacle preemption).
54 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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vindication of the perceived purposes or objectives of federal law. As in the
case of field preemption, conflict and frustration preemption are frequently
couched in terms of congressional intent: Congress, it is said, would not
want to see federal law nullified by state law and would not want the poli-
cies and purposes reflected in its enactments undermined by the application
of state law.5
Putting this together, we have four categories of preemption: express,
field, conflict, and frustration. The primary tool courts use in deciding pre-
emption cases is to determine whether a particular controversy falls into one
of these categories. If yes, then state law is preempted. If no, then state law
survives.
In addition to the formulaic categorization process, preemption doc-
trine is characterized by two general maxims that have been invoked many
times by the modem Court. The first, which dates from 1963, says that
"[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone" in every preemption
case.56 We find this bromide endlessly repeated or paraphrased in subse-
quent decisions. 7 This is so even though it is somewhat anomalous to say
that legislative intent or purpose is the "touchstone" of a doctrine in which
implied preemption plays such a large role. 8 The maxim is even more
anomalous in view of the accepted understanding that agency action can
have preemptive effect.59 Such action often issues pursuant to general
grants of regulatory authority and in response to developments that Con-
gress could have no way of anticipating when such authority was granted.
Nevertheless, we find the Court uttering the maxim about congressional in-
tent even in decisions in which displacement of state law is based on an
55 See, e.g., Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996) (noting that cases involving the implied
preemption of state banking laws "take the view that normally Congress would not want States to forbid,
or to impair significantly, the exercise of a power that Congress explicitly granted").
56 Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
57 See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) ("[O]ur analysis of the scope of the
statute's pre-emption is guided by our oft-repeated comment, initially made in Retail Clerks v. Scher-
merhorn, that '[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' in every pre-emption case." (cita-
tion omitted) (quoting Retail Clerks, 375 U.S. at 103)); Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246,
252 (1994) ("Whether federal law pre-empts a state law.., is a question of congressional intent."); Eng-
lish v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990) ("Pre-emption fundamentally is a question of congres-
sional intent."); La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) ("The critical question in any
pre-emption analysis is always whether Congress intended that federal regulation supersede state law.");
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983) ("In deciding whether a federal law pre-empts a
state statute, our task is to ascertain Congress' intent in enacting the federal statute at issue.").
58 As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in his Rice dissent, the idea of searching for a "clear and mani-
fest" congressional intent through doctrines of implied preemption is inherently contradictory. See Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 242-45 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
59 See S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV.
685,736 (1991).
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agency regulation and the Court's determination that the agency intended
the regulation to have preemptive effect.'
The other maxim, which has become controversial, dates from 1947.
This is the notion that courts should apply a presumption against preemp-
tion. In its canonical formulation, courts should "start with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress."'" Like the maxim about the importance of congressional intent, the
presumption against preemption is honored as much in the breach as in ob-
servance.62 One problem is that the presumption fails to account for the fact
that governmental powers are necessarily divided in a federal system.
Some powers are assigned to the federal government, others to state and lo-
cal governments, and some (such as the power of taxation) are exercised
concurrently. It might make sense to apply a presumption against preemp-
tion in areas traditionally assigned to the states,63 but there is no apparent
justification for such a presumption in areas traditionally dominated by the
federal government, such as the conduct of foreign affairs. The presump-
tion is at the very least overbroad, as the Court seems to have recognized in
recent decisions.64
The Court's preemption doctrine, with its formulaic characterizations
and its oft unheeded maxims, suffers from two pervasive failings. First, the
doctrine persistently misdescribes what happens in preemption cases. It
systematically exaggerates the role of congressional intent, attributing to
Congress judgments that are in fact grounded in judicial perceptions about
the desirability of displacing state law in any given area. As Ernest Young
has observed, "Many, if not most, preemption cases are not about the inter-
pretation of ambiguous statutory text, but rather about how to identify the
60 Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,152-53, 159 (1982).
61 Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
62 See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004) (finding
preemption without mentioning the presumption while the dissent applies the presumption and would
find no preemption); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (finding that federal legisla-
tion prescribing mandatory health warnings for cigarette packaging and advertising preempts a state
prohibition of outdoor cigarette advertising near schools and playground while the dissent argues that
the presumption, properly applied, would have spared state regulation concerning the location, as op-
posed to the content, of cigarette advertising from preemption); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal
Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001) (declining to apply the presumption in holding state law claims of fraud on
a federal agency preempted). As Professor Hoke has observed, the Supreme Court's devotion to its pre-
emption presumptions "can only be described as fickle." Hoke, supra note 59, at 733.
63 In fact, the decision now cited as the canonical statement of the presumption against preemption
suggests just such a limitation. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (noting that the presumption applies where
Congress has "legislated... in a field which the States have traditionally occupied").
64 See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (declining to apply the presumption to a
state regulation of international shipping, an area where the federal interest is well established). For cri-
tiques of the presumption, see Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085,
2092-96 (2000); and Main R. Scordato, Federal Preemption of State Tort Claims, 35 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1, 29-31 (2001).
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underlying purposes of federal statutes and to assess the acceptable degree
of conflict between those purposes and state regulatory measures."65 The
doctrine also exaggerates the judicial reluctance to displace state law.
While continuing to invoke the presumption against preemption, federal
courts apply preemption more than any other constitutional doctrine.66 The
Supreme Court, architect of a "states' rights revolution" in recent years, sets
the pace.67 Perhaps most importantly, preemption doctrine misdescribes
what happens in preemption cases because it downplays the degree to
which preemption results in the displacement of state law, rather than
merely preserving federal law against nullification. The Court's doctrine
and its rhetoric in most preemption cases seek to portray preemption as be-
ing little different from a routine exercise in statutory interpretation. The
interpretation of a federal statute does not ordinarily entail a judgment nulli-
fying state law, yet that far-reaching result is precisely what happens when
courts apply preemption doctrine.
A second failing of the Court's preemption doctrine is that it provides
an inadequate basis for bringing information and analysis to bear on the is-
sues implicated by decisions to displace state law. The Court's categories
of preemption and its presumption against preemption suggest that the same
formal analysis is appropriate without regard to whether the issue under
consideration has historically been undertaken by the federal government or
the states.68 And nowhere does the Court's doctrine invite litigants or
judges to consider pragmatic arguments for or against federal uniformity or
state diversity, which many commentators believe are of paramount impor-
tance in resolving displacement decisions." In a word, the Court's preemp-
tion doctrine is substantively empty. This emptiness helps mask the fact
that courts are actually making substantive decisions in the name of pre-
emption. The very emptiness of this doctrine also impoverishes the type of
record that litigants develop for courts in preemption cases, which plausibly
means that these cases are not as well decided as they would have been un-
der a different kind of doctrine.
65 Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 3, at 132.
66 See Gardbaum, Nature, supra note 15, at 768.
67 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Deci-
sions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 462-63 (2002) (noting the high instance of Supreme Court cases finding
state law preempted since the creation of the "current pro-federalism five-member majority"). Although
the Court's caseload has fallen in recent years, the percentage of preemption cases on the docket has re-
mained constant (at about 8%), and the Court's tendency to reach pro-preemption outcomes has risen, at
least in contested cases. Greve & Klick, supra note 19, at 49-50, 57.
68 See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, Federalism Theory, and
Default Rules, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 166, 166-68 (Rich-
ard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007).
69 See Spence & Murray, supra note 19, at 1162 (concluding, based on empirical survey, that "be-
cause judicial norms proscribe citing political pressures or policy preferences as the basis for judicial
decisions, all (or nearly all) preemption opinions are cloaked in the language of [formal] sets of decision
rules, regardless of the actual basis of the decision").
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A better characterization of the judicial undertaking in preemption
cases would begin by recognizing that preemption controversies involve
three inquiries, which are interwoven but analytically distinct.7" First, there
is a question about the meaning of federal law: what does the federal statute
or regulation at issue require? Second, there is a question about the mean-
ing or characterization of state law: what does state law require? Third,
there is the judgment as to whether federal law, as interpreted, is in tension
with state law, as interpreted, and whether this tension is sufficiently severe
to warrant the displacement of state law in light of all relevant factors that
bear on this decision. These factors include both larger traditions about the
appropriate division of authority between the federal government and the
states, and the pragmatics of the particular issue under consideration, most
notably determining whether the application of state law would interfere
with maintaining a single national market.
Resolution of the first question is of course a matter of interpretation of
federal law. Here, it is appropriate that courts should apply conventional
standards of interpretation. These include the understanding that the intent
or purpose of Congress is key in any case in which the meaning of a federal
statute is involved. By and large, the first inquiry in every preemption case
bears the closest similarity to the rhetoric of conventional preemption doc-
trine.
The second question, involving the correct interpretation or characteri-
zation of state law, is rarely acknowledged in preemption cases. As should
be obvious, however, preemption is required only where there is some kind
of problem with state law. A problem should not be assumed, but must be
demonstrated. This in turn demands that the requirements of state law be
accurately ascertained. Since state courts have the final authority in articu-
lating the requirements of state law, the second step in the inquiry may en-
tail the application of Erie precepts7" or perhaps even certification to state
courts.72
The final step in preemption controversies involves a judgment about
the degree of tension between the objectives of federal and state law, and
another judgement about whether this tension is too great to permit the par-
allel application of both sets of law. This third step cannot be discharged by
70 Cf Hoke, supra note 30, at 889 (recognizing that preemption entails separate inquiries into the
meaning of federal statutory law and a determination grounded in the Supremacy Clause as to whether
state law is contrary to federal statutory law).
71 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
72 On certification procedures, see Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States:
Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459 (1997); Judith S. Kaye & Ken-
neth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 373 (2000); and Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law's Erie Doctrine, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. 997 (2007). Of course, preemption often arises in state court proceedings, see, e.g., Viva! Int'l
Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., 162 P.3d 569 (Cal. 2007), in which
case the tribunal is well positioned to ascertain the requirements of state law.
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laying the requirements of federal law down next to the requirements of
state law and seeing if they conflict. Sometimes, of course, Congress ex-
pressly determines by legislation that certain state laws are preempted.73
But even in express preemption cases, the outcome frequently turns on the
resolution of statutory ambiguities such as whether state law can be said to
"relate to" a subject covered by federal law or to impose a "requirement" or
"standard" subject to federal control, and no consistent jurisprudence has
developed about the proper understanding of these terms. 4 The displace-
ment decision includes, at least implicitly, general structural considerations,
both constitutional and pragmatic, about the division of authority between
the federal government and the states, neither of which will usually be re-
vealed by the particular federal and state legal texts at issue. And it also in-
cludes, at least implicitly, an evaluation of the real-world impact of state
regulation on maintaining a national commercial market, which also will
not usually be illuminated by the texts at issue.75 The decision to displace,
in short, is a multifaceted, high-stakes discretionary policy judgment that
requires considerable sophistication if it is to be exercised properly. It is a
fair question whether any legal institution is up to the task.
III. THE VARIABLES OF INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
In order to assess the strengths and weaknesses of different institutions
in regard to their capacity to decide whether to displace state law, it will be
useful to step back and consider the constitutional framework in which dis-
placement decisions are made. Having done that, we can next identify, at
least in a preliminary fashion, some of the variables that might be invoked
in evaluating the performance of any institution asked to make such a de-
termination. Then we can offer a general assessment of how our candidate
institutions--Congress, the courts, and federal agencies-stack up against
these variables.
73 See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004) (construing the scope of ERISA's ex-
press preemption clause).
74 The "relate to" formulation is found in the notorious ERISA preemption provision. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) (2000) (preempting "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan"). Although the Supreme Court initially thought it could resolve cases arising
under this clause by simply enforcing its plain meaning, this proved unworkable, with the result that we
now have an elaborate jurisprudence of ERISA preemption. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION
AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 758-841 (4th ed. 2006). For examples of the Court's struggles over
terms like "requirement" or "standard," see Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 442-54
(2005); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 494-503 (1996); and Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
505 U.S. 504, 520-24 (1992).
75 As one commentator has written: "The task [in preemption decisions] is to determine what a
'successful' implementation of the federal scheme should look like." McGreal, supra note 7, at 838
(emphasis added).
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A. The Architecture of Displacement
Preemption in the sense of displacement is a key mechanism for order-
ing relations among different levels of government within our federated
system. Other mechanisms include judicial review of federal action
claimed to exceed the scope of federal power, the dormant commerce clause
doctrine, the use of conditional spending and conditional regulation to in-
duce states to regulate in a manner that conforms to federal policy, the
delegation of authority to state courts and agencies to enforce federal law,
the adoption of federal law designed to backstop state law, doctrines gov-
erning the choice between federal common law and state common law, and
provisions allowing states to opt out of federal law. These mechanisms ex-
ist against a backdrop of shared assumptions about the nature of the Ameri-
can federal system. These assumptions can be briefly stated and serve as a
starting point for any consideration of the variables that inform an analysis
of which institution should make displacement determinations.
One important assumption is that the state governments are the locus of
general sovereignty in the American federal system. The states inherited
the general authority of the Crown and Parliament when the colonies broke
free from England.76 The federal government was created only later and
was to engage in functions that the states were regarded as collectively or
individually incompetent to perform." Over time, the powers of the federal
government have greatly expanded through a process of reinterpretation of
the enumerated powers in which the states and the courts have generally
acquiesced.78 But it remains generally true that the states are the repository
of general sovereignty and that federal authority to act must be traced to
some specific grant of power set forth in the Constitution.79
A second important assumption is that "our economic unit is the Na-
tion."80 The Constitution is pervasively concerned with establishing and
maintaining the United States as a single integrated commercial market.
State experimentation with diverse police power measures is permitted-
even encouraged-when it does not balkanize the national commercial
76 See, e.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367,410-11 (1842).
77 Article 6 of the Virginia Plan, agreed to by the Constitutional Convention on July 29, 1787, pro-
vided that the new national legislature would have authority to "legislate in all cases for the general in-
terests of the union, and also in those to which the states are separately incompetent, or in which the
harmony on the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation." RAKOVE,
supra note 30, at 177 (quoting 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1966) (1911)). This general statement of principle was then replaced by the list of enumer-
ated powers drafted by the committee of detail, which was viewed as reflecting these principles. Id. at
178.
78 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) ("[O]ur interpretation of the
Commerce Clause has changed as our Nation has developed.").
79 See U.S. CONST. amend. X; THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 241 (James Madison) (George W. Carey
and James McClellan eds., 2001).
80 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 (1949).
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market, threaten economic retaliation, or trigger destructive interstate com-
petition. But the Constitution is centrally concerned with establishing a
"federal free trade unit."'" This meta-principle is reflected not only in doc-
trines like the dormant commerce clause, but also plays a significant role in
determining whether displacement of state law is warranted in order to ef-
fectuate the purposes of federal law.82
A third important assumption is that Congress is the critical institution
in determining. whether to activate federal authority. All mechanisms for
ordering relations among levels of government, including preemption in the
sense of displacement, accept the premise of congressional supremacy.83
Provided it acts within the scope of its enumerated powers, Congress has
authority to displace state law, and when it has clearly done so, all other ac-
tors must acquiesce in this decision. 4 Similarly, if Congress disagrees with
a displacement decision made by some other institution like an agency or a
court, Congress can, by enacting appropriate legislation, overturn such a
decision, and all other actors must acquiesce in this decision.
A fourth important assumption is that federal power, once activated, is
paramount to the authority of the states. This assumption, of course, is
made explicit by the Supremacy Clause.85 Thus, although the constitutional
framework implies that federal law is "interstitial" and state law "general,"86
federal law, once activated, dominates state law. The central question in
preemption law is whether this supremacy should be construed narrowly or
broadly. However this question is resolved, all concede that federal law,
once it is activated by Congress acting within its proper sphere, operates at
a higher order than state law.
These assumptions provide the essential backdrop to any consideration
of institutional roles in determining when state law is displaced by federal
law. Any analysis of comparative institutional competences must remain
faithful to these assumptions and must be designed to build on these as-
sumptions in constructing a workable federal system.
B. Variables of Evaluation
Against this background, what sorts of criteria should we adopt for as-
sessing the capacity of different institutions to make displacement deci-
sions? I offer here eight suggested variables for evaluating institutions.
81 Id. at 538.
82 Significantly, the Court's modem preemption doctrine evolved out of and shares common roots
with the dormant commerce clause doctrine. See Gardbaum, Nature, supra note 15, at 801-05.
83 Thus, Congress may consent to state regulation the Court has previously found preempted or to
violate the dormant commerce clause. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
84 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 92-93 (1824).
85 U.S. CONST. art. V1, cl. 2; see also supra text accompanying notes 24-32.
86 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 499-
515 (1954).
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These variables derive from different elements of the constitutional archi-
tecture that serves as a backdrop to the inquiry. Although some variables
sound more in constitutional legitimacy and others more in social utility, all
are factors that matter to participants in our legal system. The aspiration is
to draw some preliminary and general conclusions about the relative
strengths and weaknesses of the three principal candidate institutions-
Congress, agencies, and the courts-by considering how they rate relative
to variables that are widely regarded as being relevant by participants in the
legal order.
One set of variables can be called constitutional. Ideally, an institution
deciding whether to displace state law would do so in a manner that (1) is
faithful to the Constitution's division of powers between the federal gov-
ernment and the states, (2) creates stability of expectations about the rele-
vant distribution of authority among the levels of government, (3) allows all
affected actors to express their views about whether displacement is re-
quired before a decision is rendered, and (4) promotes a proper balance of
authority between the central government and the states. Another set of
variables for assessing institutions can be called interpretative. Ideally, the
decisionmaker would also decide when to displace state law based on (5) an
accurate interpretation of federal law, including, most importantly, congres-
sional pronouncements bearing on the decision to displace, and (6) a fair
characterization of the state legal regime. A final set of variables can be
called pragmatic. The decisionmaker should also have (7) a sophisticated
understanding of how uniformity as opposed to diversity in legal standards
will affect the objective of maintaining a national commercial market, and
(8) the capacity to develop and assess the facts that bear on this analysis of
uniformity versus diversity in the context at issue.
I offer a few words of additional explanation about each of these vari-
ables and then undertake a preliminary assessment of how the three princi-
pal institutions under consideration should be evaluated in light of these
variables.
1. Fidelity to the Constitution.-We live in a nation that prides itself
on being governed by a written constitution. Our Constitution expressly
addresses the division of authority between the federal government and the
states by enumerating specific powers given to the federal government, lim-
iting state power to regulate in certain areas, and stating in the Tenth
Amendment that all powers not enumerated are reserved to the states or the
people. Preemption in the sense of displacement unquestionably implicates
the division of authority between the federal government and the states.
Thus, it would seem desirable that displacement decisions remain faithful to
the general architecture of federalism and track the more specific allocation
of authority established by the Constitution.
Admittedly, the division of authority between the federal government
and the states we witness today is significantly different from the one envi-
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sioned at the time of the framing of the Constitution. I am not suggesting
that preemption decisions should strictly enforce the original understanding
of the Constitution's division of authority. Such an aspiration would appeal
to no more than a small minority of the legal community. 7 But this does
not mean that federal-state relations are not constitutionally grounded. Any
conception of federal-state relations must remain faithful to the fundamental
assumptions about the constitutional framework outlined in Section A. The
institution that makes displacement decisions should have an intuitive grasp
of this framework and its implications. In addition, there is unquestionably
an established geography of federal-state relations. For example, the fed-
eral government is understood to have dominant authority in the fields of
foreign relations, immigration, and Indian affairs, whereas the states are ac-
knowledged to have primacy in domestic relations law and the laws of in-
heritance.8" The roots of this geography are also found in the Constitution,
and the institution that makes displacement decisions should also have a
clear conception of the contours of this geography.
In short, although the division of authority between the federal gov-
ernment and the states has evolved significantly, some attempt at "transla-
tion" of the Constitution's basic postulates and specific grants of authority,
to use Larry Lessig's term,89 should be attempted in the preemption context.
What I mean by fidelity is roughly what Lessig means, which is that a con-
scientious effort should be made to link preemption decisions to the lan-
guage and received traditions of the Constitution bearing on the vertical
division of authority.
2. Stability.-It is also important that decisions to displace state law
reflect a pattern that is stable over time.90 Cumulatively, displacement deci-
sions trace a structure defining the specific boundaries between the author-
ity of the federal government and the state and local governments. In so
doing, these decisions fine-tune the landscape of federal-state authority be-
yond the general geography grounded in the Constitution. Stability in this
structure is desirable because it allows affected persons to know which level
of government is primarily responsible for which problems. Government
87 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
88 See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413-15 (2003) (foreign relations); Boggs
v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 840 (1997) (laws of inheritance); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,
462 U.S. 324, 333-34 (1983) (Indian law); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (domes-
tic relations); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941) (immigration law).
89 Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 127;
cf. Bradford R. Clark, Translating Federalism: A Structural Approach, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1161,
1171 (1998) (stressing that any translation must be "consistent with the constitutional text").
90 A variety of commentators have recognized the importance of promoting stability in determining
the allocation of authority among legal institutions. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1372-81 (1997); Jonathan T.
Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Ju-
dicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1239, 1292-1320 (2002).
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requires long-term investments in laws, in institutions, and in the human
expertise to implement them. It is important that all affected persons, in-
cluding government officials, the regulated community, and individual citi-
zens, know where they should make these investments in order to avoid
wasteful and frustrating duplication of effort.
3. Representation.-A number of commentators have emphasized
the importance of having the interests of all affected parties represented in
the process that determines the vertical division of power between the fed-
eral government and the states. 9' The most common source of concern here
has been the interests of the states. Concern for representation of the inter-
ests of the states intersects with the literature about whether the states are
adequately represented in the political process, making judicial review of
federalism questions redundant or unnecessary.9" But representation of
other interests, including the interests of the federal government and those
affected by regulation, is important too.
I do not propose to arbitrate or even review the debate about whether,
or to what extent, different interests are represented in federalism decisions.
It is enough to say that in a democratic society, allowing affected interests
to give voice to their concerns before important decisions are made is gen-
erally regarded as being a good thing. This is why, for example, decisions
by administrative agencies taken after notice and comment are generally en-
titled to greater respect than decisions taken by agencies without public in-
put.93 Therefore, decisions to displace state law should be made by
institutions capable of granting a hearing to all parties affected by such de-
cisions.
4. Balance.-A number of commentators, most prominently perhaps
Ernest Young, have argued that recent federalism decisions by the Supreme
Court can be justified as an effort to restore balance to the relationship be-
tween the federal government and the states.94 The idea here is that the fed-
eral government, especially in the decades since the New Deal, has grown
extremely powerful, to the point that it dominates the states and threatens to
turn them into subordinate administrative units of a unitary national gov-
ernment. This is said to be an imbalance of power that justifies an effort to
restore some measure of dignity and independence to the states. Those who
espouse this position naturally believe that the need for balance should be
also reflected in preemption decisions.
91 Mendelson, supra note 7, at 759-78; Sharkey, supra note 7, at 251-56; Ernest A. Young, Two
Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REv. 1349, 1352-66 (2001).
92 See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459 (2001).
93 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001).
94 See Young, Compensating Adjustments, supra note 3.
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I must confess to some ambivalence about the demand for a restoration
of balance. My unease relates to the difficulty of identifying the baseline
against which one is to make a judgment about whether the division of
power requires rebalancing.95 The federal government has unquestionably
expanded its power at the expense of the states in the decades since the
New Deal. But there are many causes of this, including technological
changes that have created a much more integrated national economy and
have brought about greater external threats to national security. Some of
these same technological changes may also have made it easier for interest
groups to capture the federal regulatory process in an effort to subordinate
the authority of the states, including through displacement. It is very diffi-
cult to distinguish the fraction of federal expansion that is a necessary and
appropriate response to a changing economic and national security envi-
ronment and the fraction that may be the by-product of new technologies of
political influence.
Yet notwithstanding the difficulties of making ultimate normative
judgments about balance, there is no question that the choice of institutions
for making preemption determinations can have a significant impact on the
balance of power between the federal government and the states. The prin-
cipal point I would make here is that different institutions face different
constraints in terms of the rate at which they can process decisions about
whether to preempt. Other things being equal, the faster decisions can be
made, the more displacement of state law there will be. Given a strong un-
derlying demand for preemption-based on greater economic integration,
greater need for economies of scale and scope, and more urgent perceptions
of external threats to the nation-increasing the rate at which preemption
decisions are processed will result in more preemption in the aggregate;
conversely, slowing down the processing rate will result in less preemption
in the aggregate.
Congress, which can act only through the cumbersome bicameral and
presentment requirements, would proceed most slowly in resolving preemp-
tion questions. We can predict that leaving all preemption decisions to
Congress would yield the lowest level of preemption, simply because Con-
gress would not get around to resolving preemption questions very often.
Courts present an intermediate case. There are many more courts than con-
gresses, so courts collectively have a much greater decisional capacity. But
litigation is expensive and time-consuming, and achieving preemption on a
national scale requires either a uniformly successful litigation campaign or
a judgment by the U.S. Supreme Court, which is tightly constrained in
terms of the number of decisions that it can render. Judges also have a ten-
dency to rule narrowly when matters are controversial, which may require
multiple trips to the courthouse before the contours of preemption in any
given field are resolved. Agencies are the fast track to preemption. Agen-
95 Ifthe baseline is the written Constitution, then this variable is redundant of the first.
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cies have nationwide jurisdiction and can usually act by rulemaking.
Rulemaking uses informal procedures, which are probably cheaper to in-
voke than litigation. And rulemaking allows multiple issues to be resolved
in one fell swoop. So at least in terms of decisional capacity, agencies have
the greatest potential to resolve preemption decisions.96
In short, although it is difficult to say with confidence that any particu-
lar balance of authority between the federal government and the states is
optimal, one can say with much more confidence that shifting the power to
preempt from courts to some other institution would have important impli-
cations for that balance in the future. Shifting authority to Congress would
slow down the rate of preemption, causing the balance of authority to tilt
more toward the states. Shifting authority to agencies would speed up the
rate of preemption, causing the balance to tilt further toward the federal
government.
5. Interpretation (Federal).-The decision to displace state law un-
questionably requires, as a predicate, the interpretation of federal law.
Congress always has the first and last word about preemption. This means
the institution that decides whether to displace state law should be adept at
interpreting congressional legislation. Here, we encounter a number of con-
troversial issues about what constitutes good interpretation. Some believe
that interpretation should seek to enforce the objectives of the enacting
body.97 Others believe that interpretation should reflect the political values
of contemporary representative institutions.98 Still others believe that inter-
pretation should reflect the "best" normative ideals that can be supported by
the language of the text and other conventional sources of meaning.99
Again, I will not attempt to arbitrate or even summarize the dispute.
Instead, I will note that whatever substantive theory of interpretation we
adopt, interpretation can be carried out in a more or less principled fash-
ion."10 Principled interpretation is that which accounts for the text and other
material conventionally regarded as bearing on questions of interpretation,
responds to objections from others grounded in these materials, and offers a
reasoned justification for the conclusion it adopts. Principled interpretation,
96 My point is not that agencies are systematically biased in favor of preemption, although some
commentators believe this is a concern and I address this possibility briefly below, infra notes 110-12
and accompanying text. The point here is only that agencies have the capacity to process more preemp-
tion controversies at greater speed than courts or Congress.
97 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Per-
spective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 885 (1975); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute,
101 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 105-26 (2001); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom
and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 817-22 (1983).
98 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
99 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225-75, 313-54 (1986); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 57-96 (2003).
100 For a sensible and subtle analysis that provides an example of what I mean by principled inter-
pretation, see HART & SACKS, supra note 1, at 1111-1380, noting particularly pages 1374-80.
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in this sense, should have a degree of predictability and stability that un-
principled interpretation will lack. Nearly all would agree that it is desir-
able that interpretation be principled.
6. Interpretation (State).-The decision to displace also requires an
accurate understanding and characterization of state law. Since state politi-
cal actors, including state courts, have the final say about the content and
meaning of state law, this variable requires a slightly different set of skills
than interpretation of federal law. The primary qualification here is good
faith in ascertaining the requirements of state law. Familiarity with the
sources and traditions of state law will be an advantage, as will be a will-
ingness to consult with states or otherwise engage in appropriate investiga-
tions into state law when its requirements are unclear.
7. Understanding Uniformity and Diversity.-The decision to dis-
place, at bottom, requires a judgment about the degree of tension between
federal and state law. This is not simply a mechanical exercise in discern-
ing "conflict," either in the sense of mutual exclusivity or frustration of
purpose. Sometimes Congress will spell out whether displacement is re-
quired. But usually, determining whether displacement is necessary entails
an inquiry into the pragmatic consequences of either uniformity or diversity
in legal standards in a given area.00 The central concern here, as under the
dormant commerce clause, is whether uniformity is needed in order to pre-
serve a single national commercial market. This meta-principle, constitu-
tional in its origins, pervades nearly all preemption controversies. It
operates, in effect, as an unacknowledged canon of interpretation in deter-
mining whether federal law requires displacement of state law. Applying
this canon requires a sophisticated understanding of the relevant market and
whether application of diverse state and local laws will have the effect of
carving that market up into submarkets of inefficient scope.
The point is not that the institution that determines whether to displace
state law should engage in a freewheeling analysis of the benefits and costs
of uniformity or of diversity in legal standards. It is also important to cali-
brate the relative dominance of federal and state law in the area in question
and to ascertain the purposes of the federal statute said to justify preemp-
tion. Still, in making a final determination whether the tension between
federal and state law warrants displacement, the decisionmaker should be
sensitive to the pervasive meta-principle favoring the maintenance of a sin-
gle integrated commercial market. Explicit consideration of this factor will
101 For overviews of the policy factors bearing on the choice between diversity and uniformity in
regulation, see DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995); Steven G. Calabresi, "A Gov-
ernment of Limited and Enumerated Powers ": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV.
752, 774-84 (1995); Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the Fed-
eral Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555 (1994); and Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:
Evaluating the Founders 'Design, 54 U. ClI. L. REV. 1484 (1987).
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lead to a more sophisticated analysis of the pluses and minuses of dis-
placement. This in turn will generate outcomes that are both more consis-
tent with congressional objectives and will do more to secure the objective
of preserving our nation as a single economic unit.
8. Factfinding.-In order to understand the different effects of uni-
formity versus diversity, it is also necessary to understand the facts as they
apply to different institutions, industries, and markets. These are "legisla-
tive facts": facts about society and about how different institutions and in-
centives influence the behaviour of different actors within society. They
are not facts about who did what when and where in some historical episode
("adjudicative facts"). Ideally, the institution that decides to displace will
have the ability to both gather the necessary legislative facts and analyze
these facts in order to make an informed decision.
C. A Preliminary Comparative Analysis
We are now in a position to apply, at least in a preliminary fashion, the
foregoing evaluative variables to our three principal candidate institutions:
Congress, the federal agencies, and the courts.
1. Congress.-Congress obviously has many strengths as an institu-
tion for deciding whether to displace state law. The constitutional architec-
ture of displacement makes Congress the critical institution in activating
federal authority. Since Congress has both the first and last word about
preemption, it makes sense that we should look to Congress to ascertain
whether it has resolved the displacement question. Congress is also the in-
stitution in which the interests of the states and other affected parties are
probably best represented. State regulators are likely to have easy access to
members of their congressional delegation, and state officials will have no
trouble securing invitations to testify at hearings that precede the enactment
of preemptive legislation."' Members of Congress, and some of their staff,
have an intuitive appreciation of the factors that should influence the choice
between uniformity and diversity. And Congress as an institution has the
capacity to investigate legislative facts.
On other variables, however, Congress is likely to perform relatively
poorly. Although members of Congress take an oath to support the Consti-
tution, Congress in recent decades has tended to cede questions of constitu-
tionality to the courts, and we are not likely to see much of a serious effort
by Congress to square displacement decisions with the division of authority
established by the Constitution."3 Congress's production of regulatory leg-
islation also tends to proceed in episodic bursts, which may not be condu-
102 Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1542-46, 1551-59 (1994).
103 On the general problem of evisceration of congressional engagement with constitutional values,
see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
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cive to stability in the division of authority. And, as previously discussed,
transferring primary authority to Congress for preemption decisions would
slow down the pace of preemption, shifting the balance of regulatory au-
thority to the states. If one believes the federal government has grown too
powerful relative to the states, this would be regarded as a good thing, but if
one believes that a globalizing world calls for fewer, rather than more, lay-
ers of domestic regulation, then it would be a cause for concern.
When we come to the interpretative and pragmatic variables, however,
we begin to see how impossible it is for Congress to play any kind of exclu-
sive or even dominant role in determining whether to displace state law.
The problem is not that Congress is institutionally incapable of spelling out
whether displacement should or should not occur. The problem, rather, is
that Congress cannot anticipate when it legislates all the situations in which
questions of displacement will arise." Legislation operates ex ante, before
particular disputes about implementation and enforcement emerge. Given
the limits of human knowledge, Congress cannot predict at the time it legis-
lates every question of federal preemption that will arise in the future.
Moreover, since displacement involves assessing the degree of tension be-
tween federal and state law, Congress would have to analyze and interpret
the common law and statutory rules of fifty states and thousands of munici-
palities. This would include not only those statutes and ordinances in exis-
tence at the time it legislated, but also all those that might be enacted in the
future. This is beyond impossible."5
The important conclusion to be drawn from this is that the decision to
displace, by its very nature, must be one that is made largely ex post rather
than ex ante. Consequently, it is necessary to identify an institution that can
resolve the questions of interpretation and displacement after the sources of
tension between federal and state law have been identified. The two most
obvious candidates for undertaking such ex post inquiries are courts and the
agencies charged with administration of federal statutes. 6
104 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 376-77.
105 See Spence & Murray, supra note 19, at 1190-91 (arguing that congressional resolution of pre-
emption questions would result either in very general provisions that would require extensive interpreta-
tion by courts, making courts the de facto institution of decision, or very specific provisions that would
produce unintended consequences).
106 In addition to the problem of capacity constraints on congressional action, commentators have
disagreed about what type of decisional rule is more likely to force Congress to act. Rick Hills has re-
cently argued that a strong presumption against preemption is more likely to induce a congressional re-
sponse because business interests will lobby to overturn rules that inefficiently disrupt economies of
scope and scale. See Hills, supra note 19, at 16-39. Alan Schwartz, focusing more narrowly on pre-
emption of tort causes of action, argues that a rule of broad preemption is more likely to elicit a congres-
sional response, at least when Congress prefers that federal law set only a floor rather than a ceiling. See
Alan Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, Capture, and Tort Law: The Regulatory Compliance Defense,
2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2000). However one resolves this dispute, Adrian Vermeule has recently of-
fered an additional reason why any strategy predicated on forcing Congress to act is unlikely to succeed.
VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 118-48. Such a strategy will work only ifjudges achieve a high degree of
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2. Federal Agencies.-Agencies compensate for many of the institu-
tional weaknesses of Congress. In particular, agencies can act in a variety
of procedural formats, including rulemaking, adjudication, and the issuance
of more informal interpretative rulings and policy advice. Thus, agencies
are capable of addressing displacement controversies ex post, after they
have crystallized, in a way that Congress cannot. Agencies also excel on
the pragmatic variables. Given their ability to draw upon the expertise of
economists and other types of regulatory specialists, agencies almost cer-
tainly have a better grasp of the impact of uniformity and diversity on a na-
tional commercial market than does either Congress or the courts.
Similarly, given their ability to undertake wide-ranging investigations of
industry structure and other types of relevant legislative facts, agencies have
factfinding abilities that surpass those of either Congress or the courts."7
On the interpretation variables, the verdict is mixed. Agencies inter-
pret federal legislation all the time, and with respect to the type of federal
interpretation that is particularly relevant in preemption controversies-the
interpretation of detailed federal regulatory statutes administered by the
agency-the agency may well have superior capacity to engage in princi-
pled interpretation relative to the courts. However, in terms of their capac-
ity to engage in good faith interpretation of state regulatory law, including
both state common law and state legislation, it is doubtful that agencies can
match the capabilities of the courts? °8
On the constitutional variables, the agencies clearly fall short. The
critical problem here is one of tunnel vision. Agencies know a great deal
about one federal regulatory scheme, and they may know quite a bit about
the pros and cons of making that particular scheme the exclusive source of
legal obligation, as opposed to one that exists concurrently with state and
local regulation. But they are unlikely to have much knowledge-or even
care-about larger questions concerning the division of authority between
the federal government and the states. There is little reason to think that
agency officials are steeped in the framework assumptions that govern pre-
emption or that they have given much thought to the general geography that
demarcates the line between federal and state authority (outside their nar-
row area of expertise). Insofar as the resolution of preemption controver-
sies implicates legal variables that go beyond narrow specialization, "the
coordination, such that they send a uniform signal to Congress that decisional responsibility has been
shifted upstream to the legislative branch. Id. at 123-29. Given the independence and diversity of
views among Supreme Court Justices and the inability of the Justices to police any more than a fraction
of lower federal court and state court decisions, it is unrealistic to expect that any such degree of coordi-
nation can be achieved. Id. at 131-32.
107 See Spence & Murray, supra note 19, at 1191-93 (concluding that the preferred solution for re-
solving preemption controversies on a basis that reflects sound policy analysis would be for Congress to
delegate authority to make such decisions to expert federal agencies).
108 See, e.g., infra sources cited note 110.
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law ought to be applied by an agency whose main business is to know the
law, rather than to enforce some part of it.'
10 9
In particular, agencies know little about constitutional law and usually
disclaim any authority to opine on questions like the scope of the commerce
power or other constitutional provisions bearing on the division of authority
between the federal government and the states. Agencies may also pose a
greater threat to stability in the division of authority, given that they are
prone to policy shifts with changes in administration and can act to imple-
ment policy shifts much more quickly than Congress or the courts. In terms
of balance, transferring preemption authority to agencies would increase the
capacity of the legal system to displace state law, which would probably re-
sult in a further shift in the direction of more federal authority.
There are also reasons to worry about bias on the part of agencies in
favor of exclusive federal regulation."' Not every agency is bent on empire
building or is captured by the firms it regulates. But these phenomena are
not unheard of and warrant caution before automatically deferring to
agency judgments about the need for preemption. Agencies may also resent
the implicit competition from other sources of regulatory authority like
states. Certainly it is hard to see agencies reining in Congress and the
President when both are bent on the expansion of federal authority at the
expense of the states. Even when directed by presidential executive order
to consider the federalism implications of their actions, agencies have gen-
erally sought to avoid such an obligation."' When they have undertaken
such an analysis, it has often been conducted in a rote fashion, frequently
justifying preemption of state law primarily, if not solely, in terms of the
bare existence of statutory authority to do so.I
2
Only with respect to representation do agencies fare well along the
constitutional variables. At least if agencies were required to engage in no-
tice and comment procedures before issuing declarations of preemption,
this would afford all affected parties, including states, an opportunity to be
heard before state law is displaced. Much of the current controversy about
the role of agencies in preemption concerns statements in the preambles of
109 JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES 124 (1927).
110 See Mendelson, supra note 7, at 794-97. Courts have long worried about trusting agencies to
determine the scope of their own jurisdiction. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and
Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203, 209-11 (2004); Ernest Gellhorn & Paul
Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 992-94 (1999).
III As Nina Mendelson notes:
The rate of federalism impact statements ... appears to be quite low. In 1999, the General Ac-
counting Office reported that only five federalism impact statements had been prepared for the
over 11,000 final rules agencies issued between April 1996 and December 1998. A sampling of
600 proposed and final rules during one quarter in 2003 revealed six federalism impact statements
prepared by agencies.
Mendelson, supra note 7, at 783.
112 Id. at 784-85.
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regulations for which neither advance notice nor opportunity to comment
was afforded."3 But at least in principle, agency determinations of preemp-
tion could be structured in such a way as to provide significant representa-
tion. This is not to say that agencies would be as responsive to the interests
of affected parties as Congress would be. Agencies are only indirectly ac-
countable to the public, and their greater degree of political insulation may
make them more attuned to the interests of the industries they regulate and
less responsive to the states and other interests than Congress would be.
3. Courts.-The strengths and weaknesses of courts are something of
a mirror image to those of Congress. The courts perform best on the consti-
tutional variables. This is not to say that they have performed especially
well here. As I have previously noted, the Court's preemption doctrine
makes no reference to the constitutional division of authority between the
federal government and the states, and it exaggerates the role that statutory
interpretation plays in preemption decisions. The relevant point, however,
is that the courts have the potential to perform better on constitutional vari-
ables than either of the other two institutions. The Supreme Court has
shown a willingness to incorporate concerns about constitutional structure
in various statutory interpretation contexts," 4 and in theory, it could move
preemption doctrine in this direction in the future. In any event, there is lit-
tle doubt that courts are more sensitive to the federalism dimensions of pre-
emption than either Congress or federal agencies are likely to be.
The division of authority established by judicial preemption decisions
is also likely to be more stable than any pattern of displacement established
by Congress or the federal agencies."' This is because courts give signifi-
cant weight to stare decisis in the preemption context. This is one respect in
which the false consciousness of courts about the nature of preemption has
produced unintended but salutary results. By portraying preemption as
largely a matter of statutory interpretation, courts have extended to preemp-
tion decisions the strong version of stare decisis ordinarily applied to statu-
tory interpretation decisions, rather than the weak version applied to
constitutional decisions."6 Given the lock-in effect of the strong version of
113 See Sharkey, supra note 7, at 229-42.
114 See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,
174 (2001) (holding that the definition of "navigable waters" in the Clean Water Act should not be in-
terpreted to include intrastate waters because such an interpretation would unnecessarily invoke the
outer limits of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470
(1991) (concluding that given federalism concerns, the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act
should not be interpreted as including state judges).
115 Molot, supra note 90, at 1310 ("Whereas interpretation by political officials is likely to vary
with the political climate, interpretation by judges tends to be comparatively more stable and consistent
over time."); David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REv. 519, 551-56
(1988) (detailing constraints that make judicial decisions more predictable than legislative decisions).
116 See Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint,
22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 284-85 (2005) ("The Court generally follows a weak theory of precedent in
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stare decisis, judicial control over preemption creates a relatively stable di-
vision of authority that allows different actors to make efficient investments
in reliance on that structure.
One area in which the courts fall short, relative to other institutions, is
with regard to representation. To be sure, states and other affected parties
can and do file amicus curiae briefs in major preemption cases." 7 But
courts are not required to respond to these briefs or even to read them.
Moreover, federal courts are the most politically insulated of all our candi-
date institutions. Thus, there is reason to think that courts are likely to be
much less responsive to the interests of states and other actors than Con-
gress and probably also less responsive than agencies.
On the interpretation variables, the courts have a strong tradition of en-
gaging in principled interpretation. Agencies may be superior interpreters
of the complicated federal statutes they administer, especially insofar as the
interpretational issues raise policy questions, but courts specialize in inter-
pretation. Insofar as issues arise that agencies have not addressed, courts
are always regarded as appropriate institutions to resolve these issues.
Courts are also by far the most preferred institution for determining ques-
tions about the meaning of state law. Neither Congress nor the federal
agencies have any relevant competence or training here.
Courts come up short most noticeably on the pragmatic variables." 8
Some judges may have ideas about the factors that should influence choices
between uniformity and diversity in regulatory standards. But it is reason-
able to assume that most do not and, if they do, that their ideas are fragmen-
tary and quite likely outdated." 9 Courts also have very limited capacities to
engage in finding legislative facts such as would inform a pragmatic deci-
sion to favor uniformity over diversity or vice versa. Thus, one would ex-
pect that insofar as judges consider pragmatic factors in deciding whether to
displace state law, it is usually at an intuitive and relatively poorly informed
level.
constitutional cases, but at least purports to follow a strong theory of precedent with respect to statutory
decisions.").
117 See Greve & Klick, supra note 19, at 69-74.
118 Adrian Vermeule is especially harsh in his assessment of the shortcomings of courts on this di-
mension. See, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 158 ("[J]udges must make interpretative choices in the
face of impoverished information, have only limited capacity to generate the needed information by
postponing interpretative choices or by conducting experiments, and have limited capacity to accurately
process the information they do obtain.").
119 See Spence & Murray, supra note 19, at 1189-90 (suggesting, based on an empirical survey of
federal preemption decisions, that judges do a poor job of distinguishing between cost-exporting and
cost-internalizing regulations).
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Taking all these factors into consideration, I believe courts should con-
tinue to function as the institution that has the last word on whether to dis-
place state law through preemption. To recapitulate the principal
considerations that enter into this judgment: Congress cannot perform the
role of resolving all or even most preemption questions because it cannot
anticipate when it legislates what preemption controversies will arise in the
future. Agencies have a stronger claim to play this role, but they are sys-
tematically weak on constitutional variables, may be unduly biased in favor
of exclusive federal regulation, and are only doubtfully superior on interpre-
tational variables, certainly with respect to state law interpretation. Given
these weaknesses, it would be a mistake to transfer broad authority from
courts to agencies to decide when to displace state law. Whatever im-
provements this might bring in terms of pragmatic variables, it would dis-
serve the cause of constitutional government. The division of authority
within the federal government would drift further from its constitutional
foundations, would become more unstable, and would probably become
more unbalanced in favor of federal power at the expense of the states. The
courts' primary weaknesses are on the representational and pragmatic vari-
ables. These weaknesses render courts less than ideal decisionmakers, but
they are offset by strengths on all other constitutional and interpretational
variables-strengths not matched by any other institution.
The best solution would seem to be to rely on courts as the primary in-
stitution for resolving preemption controversies and to augment their repre-
sentational and pragmatic capacities by drawing upon other institutions,
notably the federal agencies. This conclusion, of course, is only a general
one, based on a global consideration of characteristics of courts and agen-
cies across all fields of regulation. It is entirely conceivable that a different
allocation of institutional roles would make sense in particular contexts.
But this only brings us back to where we started: who is to decide who de-
cides if the identity of the optimal decisionmaker is to vary from one con-
text to the next? In particular, who is to decide if agencies rather than
courts should play the leading role in determining whether state law is dis-
placed in some areas, even if courts remain the default institution? As it
happens, defining the appropriate role of agencies in preemption cases is
one of the most vexed issues of public law currently confronting the Su-
preme Court.
IV. THE ROLE OF AGENCIES IN PREEMPTION
Complicating any resolution of the proper role of agencies in preemp-
tion decisions is the fact that agencies perform multiple functions that are
relevant here. In two very different senses, agencies can be a source of fed-
eral legal obligations that lead to preemption. They can make federal law,
by rulemaking for example, that a court later concludes is in sufficient ten-
sion with state law that the state law must be declared preempted. Or, a
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federal agency can issue a proclamation declaring state law preempted on
its own authority. In addition, agencies engage in interpretations of federal
law in order to determine whether state law has been preempted. In this
Part, I argue for three propositions, each of which corresponds to one of
these three functions that agencies play with respect to preemption. These
propositions are designed to move the law in the direction of the conclu-
sions preliminarily drawn from the institutional choice analysis in Part III.
They are also constrained by precedent, in the sense that the Supreme Court
could endorse any or all of them without doing any violence to its existing
decisional law.
The three propositions are: (1) Agency action can serve as a source of a
preemption determination by a court only insofar as this action has the force
of law. (2) Agencies can preempt state law on their own authority only in-
sofar as Congress has expressly delegated to them the authority to do so.
(3) Agency interpretational rulings about the preemptive effect of federal
law should be subject to a deference doctrine that is sui generis to preemp-
tion law. This doctrine would defer to agency assessments of the need for
or the practical consequences of displacing state law in an area in which the
agency has expertise and to agency findings of fact bearing on these as-
sessments, but not otherwise. These three propositions would preserve
courts as the primary institution for deciding whether state law should be
displaced, but would allow courts to draw upon the superior capacity of
agencies to make pragmatic judgments about the need for displacement.
They would also establish that Congress is the institution that has the au-
thority to decide whether to elevate agencies to a position of primary deci-
sionmaker in any given context.
A. Agency Law as a Source of Preemption
The Supreme Court has held that agency action can serve as a source
of federal law that requires preemption of state law. The most recent ruling
to this effect is Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., where the Court deter-
mined that certain regulations of the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency-permitting national banks to use operating subsidiaries and
authorizing those subsidiaries to perform the functions of national banks-
required preemption of state banking regulations that otherwise would have
applied to such subsidiaries. 2 ° In this regard, Watters builds on what is
now a substantial line of precedent. 2 '
120 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1570-71 (2007).
121 See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867-68 (2000) (holding that a regula-
tion mandating the phase-in of passive restraints in automobiles impliedly preempts a state tort law
claim predicated on the proposition that installation of air bags was mandatory); CSX Transp., Inc. v.
Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 674-75 (1993) (holding that a federal regulation governing maximum train
speed preempts a negligence claim that a speed under the federal maximum was excessive); City of New
York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1988) (holding that an FCC regulation establishing technical stan-
Preemption and Institutional Choice
One can question as an original matter whether this is correct. Recall
that preemption is grounded in the Supremacy Clause. The Supremacy
Clause specifies that displacement of state law can flow from one of three
sources: "[t]his Constitution," "the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof," and "Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States. 122 I take it that agencies cannot
enact constitutional provisions or adopt treaties. The question, therefore, is
whether they can promulgate edicts that qualify under the phrase "Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance [of the Constitution]."
The natural assumption is that the phrase refers to federal statutes duly en-
acted by Congress pursuant to the procedures of Article I, Section 7; in ac-
cordance with the grants of legislative powers in Article I, Section 8 and
elsewhere; and not transgressing the limitations set forth in Article I, Sec-
tion 9 and elsewhere.'23 As Brad Clark has pointed out, all three forms of
federal action that are denominated "the supreme Law of the Land" entail a
high degree of concurrence by representative institutions. In particular, the
concurrence of the Senate (which was thought to represent the interests of
the small states) appears to be required for each form of "supreme" law-
making. 124  Action by federal administrative agencies would seem not to
meet this requirement. The Supreme Court has expressly held to the con-
trary, concluding that "[t]he phrase 'Laws of the United States' encom-
passes both federal statutes themselves and federal regulations that are
properly adopted in accordance with statutory authorization.' 1 25  But the
fact that the Court has offered no explanation for how this conclusion can
be squared with the constitutional text reinforces disquiet about this propo-
sition.
Nevertheless, it is possible to construct an argument in support of the
idea that agency action can qualify as "Laws of the United States" for Su-
dards to govern the quality of cable television signals preempts a more stringent state regulation); Hills-
borough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) ("We have held repeatedly
that state laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes."); Capital Cities
Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698-711 (1984) (holding that an FCC regulation prohibiting the dele-
tion or alteration of out-of-state television broadcast signals preempts a state ban on television adver-
tisements for alcoholic beverages); Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 170
(1982) (holding that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's regulation permitting federally chartered sav-
ings and loan associations to exercise the due-on-sale clause of mortgages preempts a contrary state
common law rule); United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-85 (1961) (holding that a Veterans'
Administration regulation governing the calculation of deficiency judgments upon foreclosure of a gov-
ernment-insured mortgage preempts a contrary state rule).
122 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
123 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922-25 (1997); Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy
Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 91, 109-11 (2003) (noting that ear-
lier versions of the Supremacy Clause unambiguously referred to congressional legislation rather than
"Laws").
124 See Clark, supra note 30, at 1355-67.
125 City of New York, 486 U.S. at 63.
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premacy Clause purposes. An agency pronouncement must satisfy two
conditions in order to come within the language of the Supremacy Clause.
First, it must have the force and effect of federal law. Second, it must have
been adopted "in Pursuance" of the Constitution.
The meaning of the word "Laws" in the phrase "Laws of the United
States" is uncertain. Sandwiched as it is between "this Constitution" and
"all Treaties," the initial impulse is to say "Laws" must refer to federal stat-
utes-duly enacted and constitutionally valid statutes (those "made in Pur-
suance" of the Constitution). As my colleague Peter Strauss has pointed
out, however, the word "Laws" pops up again in the very same clause, with
the admonition that federal supremacy is to be respected by the judges in
every state, "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding."' 26 One could argue that "Laws" here must also refer
to statutes, namely state statutes, just as "Laws" earlier in the clause refers
to federal statutes. But notice the consequence of this reading: state com-
mon law, the most complete body of legal regulation in effect when the
Constitution was adopted, might be insulated from preemption under the
Supremacy Clause.'27 Thus, if "Laws" in the second appearance of the
word were limited to statutes, the effect would be profoundly dysfunctional.
And if, to avoid dysfunction, "Laws" must include more than statutes in the
part of the Clause that speaks of the "Laws of any State," why should
"Laws" not carry a signification broader than statutes in the context of the
"Laws of the United States"?
Other structural arguments enter into the picture here too. The mean-
ing of "Laws" in the Supremacy Clause undoubtedly must be harmonized
with the same word in virtually the same phrase in Article III of the Consti-
tution.'28 In that context, it is well established that "Laws of the United
States" include not just federal statutes, but also decisional rules adopted by
courts as a matter of federal law.'29 This suggests that "Laws of the United
States" are not limited to federal statutes, but include other rules of decision
that have the force and effect of binding federal law. And indeed, we find
126 Peter L. Strauss, The Perils of Theory, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript
at 2-3, on file with the Northwestern University Law Review), available at http://ssm.coml
abstract- 10 18982.
127 Unless one argues that state common law has legal force only because of the enactment of state
laws receiving the common law of England as the law of the state. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial
Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REV. 327, 346 (1992).
128 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, aris-
ing under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority" (emphasis added)); see Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV.
747, 766 (1999).
129 See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1972) (holding that the "laws of the
United States" for purposes of arising under jurisdiction include federal common law); see also Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938) (holding that "law" as used in the Rules of Decision
Act includes state common law).
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that federal common law has been recognized as being preemptive.130 If
federal decisional rules reached by courts can have preemptive effect as
"Laws of the United States," there is no reason in principle why rules
adopted by federal agencies cannot be regarded as "Laws of the United
States" for Supremacy Clause purposes.
Similarly, consider the appearance of the word "Laws" in the provision
of Article II of the Constitution admonishing the President to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed. 131 We could again insist that this re-
fers only to statutes enacted by Congress. But surely the President was also
expected to see that judicial judgments are faithfully executed, including
those that rest on common law.'32 And it is settled that both subordinate ex-
ecutive branch agencies and the President himself must follow duly prom-
ulgated agency regulations unless and until they are rescinded.'33 If agency-
made "law" is included in the "Laws" that the President must faithfully
execute, why should it not also be included in the "Laws" referenced in the
Supremacy Clause?
To be sure, the word "Laws" cannot be stretched beyond all recogni-
tion. Laws must refer, at a minimum, to explicit or implicit rules that bind
the future exercise of governmental authority.'34 Thus, for example, a
"sense of the Senate" resolution or a dictum in an opinion of a court should
not be regarded as "Laws" for Supremacy Clause purposes. In the agency
context, only agency action that has the force of law should be regarded as
providing a predicate for preemption. Legislative regulations and self-
executing orders have this quality; policy statements and interpretative
regulations do not.
Demonstrating that agency action with the force of law has been
adopted "in Pursuance" of the Constitution is also challenging. Yet if we
can construe the Necessary and Proper Clause as authorizing the delegation
of legislative powers to agencies, as I believe we can,'35 then there is a way
out. If Congress has made such a delegation and an agency has fulfilled the
130 See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312-14 (1981); Thomas W. Merrill, The Com-
mon Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 36-39 (1985). The Court has construed judi-
cial judgments as being included within the scope of the Supremacy Clause. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.
Co. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 220-21 (1931).
131 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
132 The President's duty to enforce final judicial judgments was acknowledged by President Lincoln
in his first Inaugural Address in attacking the decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford. 4 COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 268 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Re-
view, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 926 (1990). For an extreme view to the contrary, see Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J.
217,276-84 (1994).
133 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696 (1974); Thomas W. Merrill, The Accardi Princi-
ple, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 569 (2006).
134 For some preliminary thoughts about what sorts of decisional rules have the force of law, see
Merrill, supra note 133, at 596-99.
135 For details, see Merrill, supra note 38, at 2120-39.
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conditions for exercising that delegated power, then it is possible to speak
of the resulting edict as being one that has been made "in Pursuance" of the
Constitution, to wit, in pursuance of a legislative delegation of lawmaking
authority permitted by the Necessary and Proper Clause. Thus, if Congress
has delegated authority to an agency to act with the force of law, and if the
agency has exercised this delegated power by taking action intended to have
the force of law, then the agency edict can serve as a source of preemp-
tion.'36
Together, these arguments, if accepted, carry with them a significant
limitation on the type of agency pronouncement that can qualify as a source
of preemption for Supremacy Clause purposes. Of the various types of ac-
tion agencies can take, only agency action having the force of law can qual-
ify as a source of preemption consistent with the language of the
Supremacy Clause. Legislative regulations satisfy both conditions implied
by the Clause for identifying the type of agency action that can serve as a
source of preemption. Such regulations take the form and effect of a stat-
ute, and they are issued pursuant to a delegation of authority from Congress
to act with the force of law.'37 Agency orders issued pursuant to an adjudi-
cation that have self-executing legal force also qualify as having the force
of law.' Other types of agency action, such as policy statements, interpre-
tative rules, and opinion letters, fail to meet either or both of the conditions
imposed by the Clause.'39
Limiting agency action that can serve as the source of preemption to
that which has the force of law also has beneficial consequences in terms of
the institutional choice analysis outlined in Part III. Under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA), the issuance of legislative regulations generally
requires that the agency comply with notice and comment procedures. 40
This creates an opportunity for states and other interested parties to express
their views before potentially preemptive regulations are adopted. Simi-
136 An express delegation of authority from Congress to make binding adjudications and the exer-
cise of this power would also satisfy the "in Pursuance" requirement.
137 See, e.g., Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548, 558 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) ("A rule can be legislative only if Congress has delegated legislative power to the agency and
if the agency intended to use that power in promulgating the rule at issue."); see also Gonzales v. Ore-
gon, 546 U.S. 243, 255-56 (2006); Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 980-81 (2005); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). For a recognition
of the need for a delegation of legislative authority in the preemption context, see Louisiana Public Ser-
vice Commission v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986). See also New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 535 U.S. 1, 18 (2001) (reaffirming that courts must "interpret the statute to determine whether
Congress has given [the agency] the power to act as it has" before upholding regulation that intrudes
into areas traditionally regulated by the states).
138 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 890-92,
901-02 (2001).
139 Id. at 901-02.
140 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b), (c) (2000); cf. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2); Mead, 533 U.S. at 244 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting).
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larly, agency adjudications that lead to binding orders are subject to signifi-
cant hearing requirements, either under the APA or due process decisional
law.'4 ' Limiting the sources of agency preemption to action with the force
of law thus reinforces the representational variable in our institutional
choice analysis.
Modem administrative law norms also require that agencies disclose
relevant data and provide a reasoned response to material objections raised
in the rulemaking process. 4 2 These disclosure and reason-giving require-
ments can help supply information that bears on the choice between uni-
form federal rules or diverse state rules. Presidential executive orders
requiring that agencies prepare federalism impact statements before issuing
major rules, 4 ' if followed,'" would do even more to generate information
relevant to the decision to preempt. Accordingly, limiting agency action
that can be the source of preemption to legislative rules would also help
generate more information and analysis that bears on what I call the prag-
matic variables implicated in any decision to displace state law.
Finally, limiting agency action that can provide the source for preemp-
tion to that which has the force of law is consistent with, although admit-
tedly not compelled by, the Supreme Court's preemption decisions. The
Court's decisions drawing upon agency action as a source of preemption in-
clude both agency regulations and orders.'45 In both contexts, the Court has
been inattentive to whether the regulation at issue is legislative as opposed
to something else, like interpretative,'46 or to whether the order is legally
binding as opposed to something else, like advisory. But the decisions all
implicitly treat the regulations and orders that serve as a source of preemp-
tion as legally binding, which suggests they were at least implicitly under-
stood by the Court to have the force of law. Thus, a future decision limiting
141 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
142 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-44
(1983); Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 519-21 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-53 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
143 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4729, 4731 (Feb. 5, 1996), supplemented by
Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4,1999).
144 See Mendelson, supra note 7, at 782-86 (providing data suggesting low levels of compliance
with these requirements).
145 For examples of agency regulations held to have preemptive effect, see cases cited supra note
121; for some agency orders held to be preemptive, see Entergy Louisiana, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Ser-
vice Commission, 539 U.S. 39, 49-50 (2002) (holding that an order of a state utility commission adopt-
ing an allocation of wholesale power different from the allocation permitted by an order of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission is preempted); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel.
Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 369-70 (1988) (similar); and Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476
U.S. 953, 966 (1986) (similar).
146 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The
Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REv. 467, 545-70 (2002) (noting the casual attitude of courts about
whether regulations are legislative or nonlegislative); see also Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606,
609-10 (1991).
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the types of agency pronouncements that serve as a source of preemption to
action having the force of law would not appear to require overruling or
even questioning any existing decision. And it would be correct, both in
terms of the requirements of the Supremacy Clause and of institutional
choice.
B. Agency Authority to Preempt
A second question regarding the role of agencies in preemption is
whether and in what circumstances agencies should be allowed to preempt
state law on their own authority. The Supreme Court has assumed that
Congress has the power to delegate such authority to agencies,'47 although
the Court has never (to my knowledge) addressed the question whether such
delegations are constitutional. Congress has also assumed that it has the
power to make these sorts of delegations, as it has passed a number of stat-
utes authorizing agencies to make binding determinations of preemption.'48
One can again question whether, as an original matter, the Constitution
should be read as permitting Congress to delegate the authority to preempt
to agencies. As previously discussed, the history of the Supremacy Clause
and some of the language of that Clause suggest that the Founders origi-
nally understood that courts would make decisions about the need to dis-
place state law.'49 If the Founders understood displacement determinations
to be judicial in nature, then arguably it is a violation of the Supremacy
Clause--or of Article III, which confers the judicial power on federal
courts-to confer primary authority to make such determinations on agen-
cies.
Nevertheless, everyone apparently assumes that Congress itself can
preempt state law by appropriate legislation adopted under the authority of
the Necessary and Proper Clause. 5° If Congress can expressly preempt, and
if it also has the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to delegate
legislative authority to agencies, then it would seem to follow that Congress
can delegate legislative authority to agencies to preempt. Delegated power
147 City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63--64 (1988) ("'[A] federal agency acting within the
scope of its congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt state regulation'...." (quoting La. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986))); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs.,
471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) ("[S]tate laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well as by federal
statutes.").
148 See 30 U.S.C. § 1254(g) (2000) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to identify state laws
and regulations preempted by the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act); 47 U.S.C § 253(d)
(2000) (authorizing the Federal Communications Commission to preempt the enforcement of state and
local statutes, regulations, or legal requirements interfering with the development of competitive tele-
communications services); 49 U.S.C. § 5125(d) (2000) (authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to
determine whether particular state, local, or tribal requirements respecting the transportation of hazard-
ous materials are preempted).
149 See supra text accompanying note 40.
ISO See supra text immediately following note 37.
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to preempt thus flows from the Necessary and Proper Clause, not from the
Supremacy Clause. Moreover, allowing Congress to delegate authority to
agencies to preempt under the Necessary and Proper Clause injects some
flexibility into the allocation of institutional roles. The default position is
that courts have the final word about whether state law is displaced, but if
Congress concludes in any particular context that an agency would do a bet-
ter job of making these determinations, Congress can override the default
by delegating power to preempt an agency.
The critical question is how explicit such a delegation of authority
from Congress must be in order to permit agencies to preempt on their own
authority. I would argue that a super-strong clear statement rule is appro-
priate here; in other words, Congress must expressly delegate such authority
in the language of the statute itself. 5' The primary reason for this flows
from the conclusion of Part III that courts are as a rule better institutions to
resolve preemption questions than agencies. If we allow agencies to pre-
empt based on a general grant of rulemaking authority, or an ambiguous
grant of rulemaking authority, then the institutional choice question would
in effect be decided by agencies and courts in collaboration. Agencies
could assert power to preempt based on such a general or ambiguous grant,
and courts would then decide whether to uphold such an assertion of au-
thority based on the court's reading of implied congressional intent. Given
that agency power to preempt flows from the Necessary and Proper Clause,
and given that there are general reasons to prefer courts to agencies in de-
termining whether to preempt, it is better to leave the decision to substitute
agencies for courts squarely with Congress. Requiring a super-strong clear
statement from Congress secures this result.
This conclusion-that an express delegation of authority to preempt is
required in order to permit an agency to displace state law on its own au-
thority-is reinforced by other considerations of institutional choice dis-
cussed in Part III. Requiring an express delegation from Congress would in
effect require a double consideration of the need for preemption: once by
Congress in granting such authority to the agency and again when and if the
agency decides to exercise this authority. Such a double consideration
would afford enhanced opportunities for the states and other interested par-
ties to weigh in on the issue, thereby magnifying the degree of representa-
tion beyond what they would receive if any single institution decided the
issue alone. This double consideration would also increase the likelihood
of generating information bearing on the pragmatic dimensions of preemp-
tion.
151 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593, 619-29 (1992) (describing an array of clear
statement rules and super-strong clear statement rules developed by the Court between 1981 and 1991).
On the general utility of requiring clear statement rules to enforce federalism values, see generally Tho-
mas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 823 (2005), and the sources therein cited.
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This limitation on the role of agencies, like the first, is consistent with,
but not compelled by, existing Supreme Court precedent. There are state-
ments in some decisions from the 1980s implying that an agency can pre-
empt state law simply by exercising its general regulatory authority and
issuing a regulation that reflects the agency's intention to preempt. The
source of this mischief is Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. de
la Cuesta.152 The question in de la Cuesta was whether a regulation of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board permitting due-on-sale clauses in mort-
gages initiated by federally chartered savings and loan associations had the
effect of preempting a California common law decision prohibiting due-on-
sale clauses. 53 The case presented a relatively rare instance of straightfor-
ward conflict preemption: the federal agency said A and the state courts said
.not-A, and the determination that the state law was preempted was made by
the Court, not the federal agency. At one point in his opinion for the
unanimous Court, however, Justice Blackmun said the following:
A pre-emptive regulation's force does not depend on express congressional au-
thorization to displace state law .... Thus, the Court of Appeal's narrow fo-
cus on Congress' intent to supersede state law was misdirected. Rather, the
questions upon which resolution of this case rests are whether the Board meant
to pre-empt California's due-on-sale law, and, if so, whether that action is
within the scope of the Board's delegated authority.154
The Court in de la Cuesta was surely correct that congressional intent
to preempt is not necessary when an agency's legislative regulation con-
flicts with state law. As we have seen, an agency regulation having the
force of law, no less than a federal statute, is entitled to protection against
contrary state law under the Supremacy Clause. And the two conditions
that must be satisfied in any case for a regulation to have the force of law
are (1) a delegation of authority from Congress to act with the force of law,
and (2) the agency's intention to exercise such authority.'55 The problem is
that the quoted passage above can also be read to imply that agencies have
authority to preempt state law through legislative regulations issued under
their general rulemaking authority, without regard to whether there has
been a specific delegation of this authority. This implied proposition was
completely unnecessary to the decision, however, which rested on a con-
ventional finding of conflict preemption by the Court, not any determina-
tion that the agency could preempt on its own authority.
More recently, the Court has signalled that something like a super-
strong clear statement is required before agencies can issue legislative regu-
lations that preempt state law on their own authority. In Gonzales v. Ore-
152 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
Id. at 151.
154 Id. at 154 (citation omitted).
155 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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gon,'56 the Court observed that a delegation of authority to an agency to
promulgate standards for regulated entities does not entail "the authority to
decide the pre-emptive scope of the federal statute" unless a separate dele-
gation of such authority is evident in the statute.'57  And in Watters, the
three Justices who reached the question of agency preemption indicated that
something like a very clear intention to delegate is required before conclud-
ing that Congress has given an agency the authority to preempt on its own
authority.'58 These recent statements reflect a more fully considered view of
the question than the Court gave to the issue in de la Cuesta and represent a
sounder resolution of the issue.'59
C. Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations
Concerning Preemption
The third question concerns the degree of deference courts should give
to agency views about whether federal statutes and regulations require pre-
emption. Here we are not concerned with the source of federal law said to
156 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
157 Id. at 263. The Court's exact words were more opaque, but I believe I have translated their
meaning correctly. The Court said that a general delegation of authority to an agency does not entail
"the authority to decide the pre-emptive scope of the federal statute because '[n]o such delegation re-
garding [the statute's] enforcement provisions is evident in the statute." Id. (quoting Adams Fruit Co. v.
Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649-50 (1990)).
158 Justice Stevens observed that "Congress knows how to authorize executive agencies to preempt
state laws," citing three statutes in which the power to preempt had been expressly delegated. Watters v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1582 & n.21 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). He further ob-
served that "there is a vast and obvious difference between rules authorizing or regulating conduct and
rules granting immunity from regulation." Id. at 1583. After reviewing the statutes delegating authority
to the OCC to authorize or regulate the conduct of national banks, he concluded that these should not be
read as "expressly or implicitly grant[ing] the OCC the power to immunize banks or their subsidiaries
from state regulation." Id. at 1582-83.
159 Several decisions in the 1980s influenced by de la Cuesta contain language suggesting that
agencies have authority to preempt under their general rulemaking authority. See, e.g., City of New
York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 64 (1988) ("[lI]n proper circumstances the agency may determine that its au-
thority is exclusive and pre-empts any state efforts to regulate in the forbidden area."); Hillsborough
County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714-16 (1985) (implicitly assuming that the FDA
can legitimately declare its regulations preemptive); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691,
699 (1984) ("When the administrator promulgates regulations intended to pre-empt state law ,.... [i]f
[h]is choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the
agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative
history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned." (citations omitted)).
But in one case the statement was dicta (the Court found no agency intention to preempt), see Hillsbor-
ough County, 471 U.S. at 716, and in the others the Court indicated that Congress had ratified the
agency's power to preempt by subsequent legislation, see City of New York, 486 U.S. at 66-69. The
ratifying statute in City of New York, the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, also applied to the
authority exercised in Crisp. Most importantly, in none of these cases did the Court address the question
whether an express delegation of preemptive authority is required. So none of these decisions should
bar a decision by the Court holding that agencies have authority to preempt on their own authority only
if they are expressly delegated such power by Congress.
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require preemption. That source, as we have seen, can be either a federal
statute or agency action having the force of law or some combination of
both. Moreover, we are assuming away the possibility that Congress has
expressly delegated authority to an agency to make preemption determina-
tions on its own authority. The question here is what happens if an agency,
not exercising an expressly delegated power to preempt, offers the legal
opinion that federal law warrants the conclusion that state law is pre-
empted? How much deference is such an opinion entitled to receive from a
court?
We must begin by tracing the legal landscape as it exists today with re-
gard to the degree of deference courts give to agency conclusions of law.
The Supreme Court has identified three standards of review for evaluating
agency interpretations of statutes: the Chevron standard, the Skidmore stan-
dard, and de novo review.16° These three standards rest on different ration-
ales for affording deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.
"A precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation
of administrative authority." '161 This delegation, in turn, creates a presump-
tion that Congress intended the agency, rather than the courts, to exercise
primary interpretational authority under the statute. 62 Under Skidmore, in
contrast, no particular delegation of power to the agency is required before
it is entitled to deference.'63 Deference under Skidmore is grounded not on
delegated power, but rather on the desirability of drawing upon the "spe-
cialized experience and broader investigations and information" available to
the agency" 4 and on the need to preserve uniformity between administrative
and judicial understandings of the requirements of a national program.'65
De novo review is the default that applies where the circumstances for at-
tributing some special competence to agencies are altogether missing. De
novo review generally applies when courts interpret laws that are designed
to hold agency power in check, including provisions of the Constitution and
of general statutes like the APA. It also applies when courts address legal
requirements as to which agencies have no claim to expertise, such as fed-
eral laws administered by the courts or other agencies, or state law adminis-
tered by state courts.
160 See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-28, 234-35 (2001).
161 Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990); see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (stating that deference rests on either express or im-
plied delegation of power to an agency).
162 See Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 519 U.S. 465, 479 n.14 (1997) (noting that
Chevron deference "arises out of background assumptions of congressional intent" (citing Smiley v.
Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996))); Smiley, 517 U.S. at 740-41 (noting that Chevron
rests on the "presumption" that Congress meant for the agency to "possess whatever degree of discre-
tion" statutory ambiguity allows).
163 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
164 Id. at 139.
165 Id. at 140.
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Given these differences in the legal underpinnings of Chevron,
Skidmore, and de novo review, the standards with which they are associated
impose different degrees of constraint on the courts. Chevron deference,
when it applies, is mandatory, in the sense that courts must accept any
agency interpretation that is consistent with the statute and is otherwise
"permissible" or "reasonable."'66 Skidmore deference, in contrast, rests in
the sound discretion of the court. "The weight of such a judgment in a par-
ticular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro-
nouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lack-
ing power to control."'67 As the Court put it in Mead, an agency opinion
evaluated under Skidmore receives the degree of deference appropriate to
"the merit of its writer's thoroughness, logic, and expertness, its fit with
prior interpretations, and any other sources of weight."'68 De novo review,
of course, gives no weight to the interpretational views of the agency, and it
may even require that the agency view be discounted on the ground that the
agency may have a conflict of interest in interpreting constraints on its own
authority.
In light of the analysis of the previous Section, the Chevron standard
should apply to agency opinions about preemption in only one circum-
stance: where Congress has expressly delegated authority to the agency to
preempt and the agency has exercised this delegated authority. Chevron is
grounded in a delegation of authority from Congress to an agency to deter-
mine certain unresolved questions of federal law. If Congress has delegated
authority to an agency to make binding determinations of preemption and
the agency has invoked that authority in offering its view about the preemp-
tive effect of federal law, then the preconditions for Chevron deference
have been established. But if these stringent conditions are not satisfied,
then courts should not apply the Chevron standard to agency views about
preemption.
In particular, generic grants of rulemaking authority should not be con-
strued as conferring authority on agencies to issue declarations of preemp-
tion entitled to Chevron deference.'69 If these sorts of grants of rulemaking
authority were sufficient to delegate authority to agencies to make binding
determinations of preemption, then virtually every federal administrative
166 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (holding that a reasonable agency interpretation is given "controlling
weight").
167 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
168 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001).
169 See Merrill & Watts, supra note 146, at 493-526; cf Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
309-10 (1979) (holding that 5 U.S.C. § 301, which confers authority on the heads of executive depart-
ments to prescribe regulations for the "government of his department," does not confer authority to
make legislative rules); ICC v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry., 167 U.S. 479, 494-95 (1897)
(holding that an agency cannot be given legislative rulemaking authority by implication, only by express
grant).
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agency would be empowered to make such determinations-and logically,
would be entitled to Chevron deference for its legal opinions in exercising
this authority. If in contrast, as argued in the last Section, agencies can pre-
empt on their own authority only if they have been expressly delegated the
authority to do so, then the universe of Chevron-eligible agency preemption
decisions shrinks dramatically. Moreover, even if the express delegation
limitation is rejected, an agency's statement of its opinion about the pre-
emptive effect of a regulation set forth in the preamble of a regulation or an
amicus curiae brief should certainly not be eligible for Chevron deference.
"Opinion letters" and "interpretative rules" are nonbinding forms of agency
action, offering only advice to the regulated community about an agency's
understanding of the law's requirements. 70 They do not have the force of
law and hence are not eligible for Chevron deference-whether or not pre-
emption is in the picture. 7'
Chevron is also the wrong standard for reviewing agency opinions
about preemption from an institutional choice perspective. Superficially
considered, the rationale for Chevron deference might seem to be applicable
here. Chevron rests on the observation that resolving ambiguities in federal
statutes entails making policy judgments, and Congress generally delegates
authority to make policy judgments to the agency that administers the stat-
ute, not to the courts.' As we have seen in Part II, the resolution of pre-
emption controversies also entails making policy judgments, in this case
judgments about whether the degree of tension between policies discerned
in federal statutes and the persistence of diverse state rules on the same sub-
ject requires displacement of state law. If agencies are generally preferred
over courts as resolvers of policy disputes, why not here too?
The answer reverts again to the discussion in Part III. We saw there
that although preemption entails the resolution of policy disputes, those dis-
putes have significant dimensions along which courts are likely to perform
better than agencies-dimensions such as preserving fidelity to the Consti-
tution's division of powers, the need for preserving stability in that division,
the desirability of preserving an overall balance between state and federal
authority, and the need to discern accurately the nature and content of the
state law alleged to be in tension with federal law.' On balance, these di-
mensions are sufficiently important in the overall assessment of institutional
strengths and weaknesses that courts are probably a better institution for
making preemption decisions than agencies. It follows from this conclusion
that to require courts to give conclusive weight to reasonable agency judg-
170 See, e.g., 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.4 (4th ed. 2002).
171 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234; Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
172 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provi-
sions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 307-08 (1988).
173 See supra text accompanying notes 114-17.
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ments about the desirability of preemption under the Chevron doctrine
would represent a transfer of decisional authority to an institution that is not
as well positioned to make these judgments.
What about splitting the atom of preemption?'74 In particular, what
about granting Chevron deference to agencies on the meaning of federal
statutes while reserving for courts a larger measure of independent authority
to determine whether a federal statute, as construed, requires preemption of
state law? Justice Scalia suggested such an approach in Smiley v. Citibank
(South Dakota), N.A.'75 His opinion for the Court cautioned against confus-
ing "the question of the substantive (as opposed to pre-emptive) meaning of
a statute with the question of whether a statute is pre-emptive."'76 And he
added: "We may assume (without deciding) that the latter question must
always be decided de novo by the courts." 1" Recall too the discussion in
Part II, suggesting that there are three distinct inquiries in preemption con-
troversies: the meaning of federal law, the characterization of state law, and
whether the degree of tension between them requires displacement of state
law. Why not pull these inquiries apart and apply different degrees of def-
erence to agency opinions about each?
Although I was initially drawn to such an atom-splitting resolution, I
now think it would be a mistake. First, it would probably be unworkable.
As noted in Part II, although the three inquiries in preemption cases are ana-
lytically distinct, they are in practice interwoven. Indeed, with rare excep-
tions like Smiley, courts do not acknowledge that there are distinct inquiries
at all. Asking courts to begin distinguishing between "meaning" and "dis-
placement" would probably produce a mass of confusion. There is also a
very legitimate concern about excessive complexity in the formulation of
standards of review. The Chevron doctrine, thanks primarily to the poorly
executed Mead decision, is now burdened by a vague and unworkable set of
precepts about when it does and does not apply, which has magnified the
costs of litigation with little discernible benefit.' Carving up preemption
cases into multiple inquiries with different standards of review applicable to
each issue would represent an analogous type of complication, generating
new fights about the correct application of standards of review and having
only a marginal impact on the ultimate resolution of preemption controver-
sies.
In addition to being unworkable, drawing a line between meaning and
displacement would be vulnerable to agency manipulation. Suppose an
174 Cf U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (ob-
serving that in adopting federalism the "Framers split the atom of sovereignty").
175 517 U.S. 735 (1995).
176 Id. at 744.
177 Id.
178 See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 215-23; see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine:
Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 807 (2002).
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agency supports the conclusion that state law should be preempted, but in-
stead of offering the legal opinion that displacement is warranted, which on
the proposed approach would be subject to some standard of review lesser
than Chevron, the agency instead interprets the federal statute it administers
(by hypothesis entitled to Chevron deference) in such a way that a court is
virtually compelled to make a finding of preemption. Given the interrelated
nature of the questions presented by preemption controversies, what is to
prevent agencies from ratcheting the Chevron deference they get for ques-
tions of statutory meaning into de facto Chevron deference for questions of
displacement?
The preemption issue in Watters'79 provides an illustration of the po-
tential for manipulation that the atom-splitting approach would create.
There, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency asserted multiple
pathways to the conclusion that state authority to regulate the financial con-
dition of operating subsidiaries of national banks was preempted. One
pathway relied on the OCC's Rule 7.4006, which provided that "[u]nless
otherwise provided by Federal law or OCC regulation, State laws apply to
national bank operating subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws ap-
ply to the parent national bank."' 8° Here the regulation makes express ref-
erence to the application of state law, and thus the regulation can be readily
identified as a declaration of preemption. This would be entitled to some-
thing less than Chevron deference under the atom-splitting approach. But
the OCC also argued that preemption was required by another regulation,
Rule 5.34(e)(3), which provided that an operating subsidiary shall engage in
activities "pursuant to the same authorization, terms and conditions that ap-
ply to the conduct of such activity by its parent national bank."'' Here,
there was no explicit reference to the application of state law, and so on its
face the regulation would not present itself as speaking to preemption.'82
Yet if this regulation were given Chevron deference on the ground that it
speaks to the meaning of federal law rather than the need for displacement,
the result would be exactly the same: by equating operating subsidiaries
with the parent national bank, the regulation would compel the conclusion
that operating subsidiaries, like the parent bank, are exempt from state regu-
latory requirements because the parent bank is governed by an express pre-
emption provision. 113
179 Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007).
180 Id. at 1572-73; 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2007).
181 Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1569-72; 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(3).
182 Nor did the OCC suggest that this regulation had preemptive effect when it was adopted; the
OCC did not even see the need to provide a federalism summary impact statement. See Financial Sub-
sidiaries and Operating Subsidiaries, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,905 (Mar. 10, 2000) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 5
(2001)).
183 See 12 U.S.C. § 484 (2000) (expressly preempting state visitorial powers as applied to national
banks). Similarly, the OCC argued that preemption follows from its Rule 34.4(a), which provides that
"a national bank may make real estate loans" without regard to state law requirements for "licensing"
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I am not suggesting that the OCC was engaged in conscious manipula-
tion in Watters. I use the case only to illustrate the potential for manipula-
tion that would arise if agencies were given strong deference on a critical
input into the inquiry about preemption-the meaning of federal law-and
a lesser degree of deference or no deference on the resolution of whether
preemption is warranted. An agency bent on preemption could interpret
federal law, including its own legislative regulations, in such a way as to
handcuff the courts from reaching any conclusion other than preemption.
This too would reflect a transfer of institutional authority in a manner con-
trary to the analysis of Part III.
What then about Skidmore deference? As suggested in Part III, what is
needed is a conception of the agency role that allows courts to draw upon
the strengths of agencies in terms of the interpretational and pragmatic vari-
ables while preserving the role of the courts insofar as the constitutional
variables are concerned. Of the three established standards of review-
Chevron, Skidmore, and de novo-Skidmore seems to come closest to strik-
ing the right balance. Skidmore would appear to instruct courts to consider
carefully agency views, grounded in experience, on the meaning of federal
law and the need for preemption. Yet it would require courts to follow
these views only to the extent they are persuasive, thereby preserving judi-
cial authority to maintain a uniform jurisprudence of preemption that is sen-
sitive to the constitutional variables discussed in Part III that make courts
the preferred institution for making the final determination whether to dis-
place state law.
If forced to choose between the three established standards of review
(Chevron, Skidmore, de novo), I would urge adoption of the Skidmore stan-
dard for preemption cases.1"4 For several reasons, however, I think the best
course of action is to eschew any of the established three standards and in-
stead adopt an approach to agency views about preemption that is sui
generis to preemption cases. That standard would treat preemption contro-
versies as a special category, distinct from judicial review of agency action
in which the usual menu of standards of review has been developed. It
might instruct courts to give "significant weight" to agency views about the
practical impact of diverse state rules on the implementation of federal
regulatory schemes that they administer or as to which they have significant
experience and expertise. It might give even more weight to agency views
and "registration," 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a), in combination with Rule 34.1(b), which provides that "[t]his
part applies to national banks and their operating subsidiaries as provided in 12 CFR 5.34," 12 C.F.R.
§ 34.1(b). Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1571. Again, by equating operating subsidiaries with national banks,
the rule in effect mandates that operating subsidiaries enjoy the same preemption status as national
banks. Id.
184 Other commentators have advocated adoption of the Skidmore standard for reviewing agency
preemption decisions. See Mendelson, supra note 7; Sharkey, supra note 7. This was also the position
urged in the amicus brief I filed on behalf of the Center for State Enforcement of Antitrust and Con-
sumer Protections Laws in Watters. See supra note 8.
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on these issues-perhaps even "conclusive weight"-when the agency has
developed its assessment in a proceeding in which the states and other in-
terested parties have been allowed to participate through notice and com-
ment proceedings. Such a differentiation would be designed to give further
encouragement to agencies to use more consultative procedures like notice
and comment rulemaking in addressing preemption questions. But the
standard would reserve for independent judicial judgment all other issues
that bear on the ultimate decision of whether state law is preempted.
Why apply such a sui generis approach to preemption rather than sim-
ply borrow the established Skidmore test? First and most importantly, the
Skidmore test does not focus on the variables in preemption where input
from agencies would be most helpful. Skidmore cites a list of factors that
tend to make any official decision more or less persuasive, such as the
"thoroughness evident in its consideration," the "validity of its reasoning,"
whether it is consistent with earlier and later pronouncements on the sub-
ject, the expertise of the decisionmaker on the subject in question, and so
forth.18 This does nothing to channel attention to those aspects of the pre-
emption decision where the agency can provide the most help to the court,
namely in assessing the practical impact of diverse state rules on the objec-
tive of maintaining a single integrated commercial market.
Another reason relates to the previous discussion about why the atom-
splitting approach should be rejected as unworkable and subject to manipu-
lation. If atom-splitting is rejected, then presumably a single standard of
review should apply to all questions of law presented in any preemption
case. Suppose that it is the Skidmore standard. Yet it is conceivable that
similar questions of statutory meaning would also arise in some other con-
text, such as ordinary judicial review of agency action, in which case the
Chevron standard presumably would apply if the preconditions for Chevron
deference were otherwise met. We would thus have the prospect of the
same question of law being subject to either the Chevron standard or the
Skidmore standard, depending on whether the question arose in a preemp-
tion context or some other context. This would lead to conundrums about
how Skidmore conclusions should be treated when they later arise in a
Chevron context and vice versa.'86 These sorts of doctrinal convolutions are
best avoided. 87
185 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944); see also United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001). See generally Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of
the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1250-59 (2007).
186 This is analogous to the puzzles created by the possibility of courts interpreting statutes in origi-
nal proceedings (where de novo review or Skidmore deference applies), followed by agencies construing
the same statute in agency proceedings (where Chevron applies). See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n
v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); Watts, supra note 72.
187 The convolutions would be avoided in my proposed approach because judicial preemption rul-
ings would be a species of de novo review, which would supersede or pretermit any agency interpreta-
tion otherwise entitled to Chevron deference.
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Finally, the Skidmore test at this point has a certain degree of negative
baggage that carries over from the Court's internal debates about the proper
scope of the Chevron standard. Justice Scalia, in particular, has a strong
aversion to Skidmore, given its open-ended, all-things-considered over-
tones, which he regards as providing inadequate guidance. 8 Given this an-
tipathy to Skidmore from one of the Court's administrative law experts, the
process of building consensus for a standard of review in preemption cases
is likely to proceed more effectively if the Court considers preemption as a
discrete category, rather than if it feels it has to import some preestablished
standard of review from existing administrative law materials.
The Supreme Court's various pronouncements about the role of agen-
cies in preemption controversies are largely consistent with the conclusion
that the Court should adopt a sui generis standard of review that focuses on
the agency's assessment of the practical impact of diverse state standards.
One can mine the Court's decisions for a variety of conflicting propositions
about the degree of deference owed to administrative agencies in determin-
ing questions of preemption. There are statements appearing to presuppose
that courts should give strong deference to agency views about preemp-
tion, "'89 statements appearing to contemplate an intermediate degree of def-
erence to agency views, 90 and statements suggesting that the question of
preemption should be decided de novo without giving any weight to agency
views.' 9' Taken as a whole, however, the pronouncements by the Justices
on this subject are highly supportive of the proposed approach.
Consider the Court's discussion in Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
Inc.," ' the airbag preemption case. The Court concluded that it would give
"some weight" to the agency's interpretation of its regulation as impliedly
preempting state tort liability.'93 The Court noted:
Congress has delegated to DOT authority to implement the statute; the subject
matter is technical; and the relevant history and background are complex and
extensive. The agency is likely to have a thorough understanding of its own
regulation and its objectives and is "uniquely qualified" to comprehend the
likely impact of state requirements. And DOT has explained FMVSS 208's
objectives, and the interference that "no airbag" suits pose thereto, consistently
over time.'94
Considering these factors, the Court concluded that "the agency's own
views should make a difference."'95 This is consistent with the proposed
188 Mead, 533 U.S. at 245-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
189 See City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 64 (1988).
190 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000).
191 See La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986).
192 529 U.S. 861.
193 Id. at 883.
194 Id. (citations omitted).
195 Id.
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approach, especially the Court's statement about the agency's unique quali-
fication to assess the "likely impact of state requirements."'96
A similar conclusion follows from the discussion of agency views on
preemption in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr. '97 The Medical Device Amendments
include a provision expressly preempting any requirement different from
the federal requirements applicable to medical devices, as well as an un-
usual provision delegating authority to the FDA to "exempt" particular state
requirements from this express preemption.'98 The Court did not regard this
express delegation to the FDA to mean that courts had to defer to any rea-
sonable agency interpretation of the express preemption statute, as would be
required by Chevron. To the contrary, the Court independently interpreted
the ambiguities in the statute, in particular the uncertainty about the mean-
ing of "requirement."''  Only after this extensive consideration of the inter-
pretative issues did the Court turn to the FDA's views. The Court cited a
number of factors that caused it to give those views "substantial weight,"
including the FDA's general familiarity with the requirements of the Act,
the process the FDA had instituted for offering "advisory opinions" to in-
terested parties about whether particular state requirements are preempted,
and Congress's specific delegation to the agency of authority to exempt
state requirements from preemption."' There is no suggestion in the opin-
ion that the Court was applying Chevron's framework or that it regarded the
agency's views as controlling as long as they were reasonable. Instead, the
Court said only that its independent conclusion was "substantially in-
formed" by the FDA's view about preemption.20
The opinion of the dissenting Justices in Watters is further consistent
with the proposed approach. The dissenters rejected Chevron deference on
the ground that it would too "easily disrupt the federal-state balance," not-
ing that agencies are not designed to represent the interests of states and are
unlikely to show sufficient respect for state sovereignty.0 2 But the dissent-
ers added: "To be sure, expert agency opinions as to which state laws con-
flict with a federal statute may be entitled to 'some weight,' especially
when 'the subject matter is technical' and 'the relevant history and back-
ground are complex and extensive."'2 3 This statement is particularly sig-
nificant given that the dissenters in Watters-who were the only Justices to
address this issue-represent an unusual cross-section of the Court. Their
spokesman, Justice Stevens, is probably the Court's most anti-preemption
196 Id.
197 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
198 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)-(b) (2000).
199 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486-91.
200 Id. at 496.
201 Id. at 495.
202 Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1584 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203 Id. (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000)).
Preemption and Institutional Choice
Justice; yet he was joined by Justice Scalia, who is probably its most pro-
preemption Justice, 204 and by a new Chief Justice who will probably be
around for quite some time. If these three can agree on a formula that gives
"weight" to agency views but that does not afford Chevron deference, then
it is not difficult to foresee a majority of the Court coming around to a simi-
lar view in the near future.
CONCLUSION
Institutional choice analysis is difficult to undertake. It rests ultimately
on empirical judgments about the capabilities of different legal institutions.
These judgments are handicapped by the lack of relevant information and
because the inquires are so complex.2"5 The analysis is especially difficult
when the criteria for evaluation include both variables sounding in legiti-
macy (the constitutional and interpretational variables) and consequences
(the pragmatic variables), which are incommensurate. Nevertheless, I hope
this exercise has suggested that institutional choice can be a valuable heu-
ristic, especially when considering a discrete issue like preemption where
there is increasing controversy over the assignment of institutional roles.
In terms of the larger picture, the conclusions I reach are fairly conven-
tional. Absent resolution of the question by Congress, courts are the best
(that is, the least worst) institution to decide whether to displace state law in
order to further federal policy objectives, but courts should draw on the ex-
pertise of agencies in helping to understand the pragmatic variables that
bear on the preemption decision.
When we focus in more closely on the problem, however, the institu-
tional choice perspective yields some more unconventional payoffs. The
analysis suggests that the Court's official preemption doctrine does a poor
job of isolating the relevant variables for decision and could be profitably
recast to better highlight what needs to be decided in order to determine
whether to displace state law.06 In particular, the background assumption
favoring the maintenance of a single commercial market has been obscured
by the Court's attempt to cast preemption as an ordinary exercise in statu-
tory interpretation. The analysis also suggests that a good dose of formal-
ism in approaching the role of agencies in preemption, in particular
differentiating more sharply between legislative and other types of regula-
tions, would advance the correct allocation of institutional roles in this con-
text. Specifically, courts should require that agency action have the force of
law before it can serve as a source of preemption and should demand an ex-
press legislative statement by Congress delegating authority to preempt be-
204 Greve & Klick, supra note 19, at 82.
205 See VERMEULE, supra note 1; Merrill, supra note 3.
206 1 have set forth one proposal for such a recasting in Merrill, supra note 68, which argues for the
adoption of area-specific default rules in lieu of the current set of categories and presumptions.
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fore agencies can preempt on their own authority. Finally, the analysis
suggests that a sui generis review standard that focuses on the agency's as-
sessment of pragmatic variables will provide a better way of drawing on the
strengths of agencies in regard to preemption than simply adopting any one
of the options from the usual menu of review standards: Chevron versus
Skidmore versus de novo. These are conclusions that cannot be reached us-
ing doctrinal analysis alone and are suggestive of the kinds of benefits that
might be obtained by refocusing on "deciding who decides" in other con-
texts as well.
